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BENCHMARK COMPETITION
SUE S. GUAN*
ABSTRACT
Over-the-counter (“OTC”) markets—those for currencies, derivatives,
swaps, bonds, and commodities, for instance—make up an immense and
critical component of global financial markets. Certain benchmarks, such as
the London Interbank Offered Rate (“LIBOR”), are hardwired throughout
these markets and play crucial roles in pricing and valuation. For example,
interest payments on instruments ranging from student loans and mortgages
to synthetic derivatives are tied to the value of LIBOR. In 2016, estimates of
notional exposure to U.S. dollar LIBOR totaled about $200 trillion—ten
times U.S. gross domestic product (“GDP”) that year. Correspondingly,
minuscule variations in a benchmark’s value will impact vast numbers of
assets and transactions for hundreds of millions of people.
These benchmarks have become so ubiquitous for an important reason:
they have introduced substantial harmonization effects in otherwise
decentralized, opaque dealer markets. These benefits fit within the prevailing
view of financial regulation: because sophisticated market participants,
through wealth-maximizing behavior, tend to select towards structures that
maximize efficiency, in aggregate social welfare is maximized, meaning that
observed equilibria are likely the most efficient equilibria. And thus, OTC
markets have remained largely unregulated for decades.
This Article argues that this understanding is incomplete and identifies
a fundamental misalignment between what is privately optimal and what is
socially optimal in OTC markets. By undertaking a structural analysis, this
Article documents overreliance by market participants on benchmarks even
when they are substantially suboptimal. Thus, in contrast to existing reform
proposals, which overwhelmingly assume that a single benchmark will
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continue to dominate, this Article proposes an alternative competitive
equilibrium—one where multiple benchmarks compete.
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INTRODUCTION
Financial trading markets are generally organized in one of two ways:
exchange-based or over-the-counter (“OTC”). Exchange-based markets,
such as the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”), function similarly to
auction markets, where buyers and sellers submit prices at which they are
willing to transact, and transactions take place at the highest bid to buy and
lowest offer to sell.1 These exchange-based markets are highly regulated and
1. For a broader explication of exchange-based equities markets, see generally MERRITT B.
FOX, LAWRENCE R. GLOSTEN & GABRIEL V. RAUTERBERG, THE NEW STOCK MARKET: LAW,
ECONOMICS, AND POLICY (2019). Most stock purchases and sale transactions take place on
exchanges. Such markets are largely transparent, anyone can participate, and little is left to
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feature a centralized limit order book that coordinates participants’ price
quotes and executions.2 OTC markets are the opposite. They are
decentralized dealer markets, characterized by bilateral transactions between
an end user and a dealer such as Goldman Sachs or another large marketmaking entity.3
OTC markets developed as marketplaces for assets that may not be as
standardized or as liquid as those more commonly traded on exchanges.
Interest rate products, bonds, foreign exchange products, complex
derivatives, and many commodities are traded on OTC markets.4 Although
OTC markets receive less academic and regulatory attention than exchangebased ones, a vast amount of trading takes place on them, with estimates of
notional value often in the hundreds of trillions of dollars.5 For example, in
2018, estimates of OTC derivatives markets measured over $550 trillion in
notional amount outstanding.6 Over $5 trillion a day turns over in the
markets for foreign currency alone.7
This Article is concerned with OTC markets that rely on benchmarks,
such as the London Interbank Offered Rate (“LIBOR”) or the WM/Reuters
negotiate. The best executable price quotes are consolidated and made available to market
participants, often on a central limit order book, and exchanges have little ability to exclude anyone
from access. Almost every aspect of such exchanges is heavily regulated: the providers of the
exchanges (now for-profit companies), those who can transact on an exchange (broker-dealers),
their duties to counterparties, what right (if any) exchanges have to exclude would-be participants,
what trades and quotes must be reported, and to whom, rules of competition between exchanges,
and so forth.
2. See id.
3. For purposes of this Article, I will use “OTC markets” to refer to markets in which nonequities OTC assets are traded.
4. See, e.g., Gabriel V. Rauterberg & Andrew Verstein, Assessing Transnational Private
Regulation of the OTC Derivatives Market: ISDA, the BBA, and the Future of Financial Reform, 54
VA. J. INT’L L. 9, 11–13 (2013) [hereinafter Rauterberg & Verstein, Transnational Regulation];
Vincent Glode & Christian C. Opp, Over-the-Counter vs. Limit-Order Markets: The Role of
Traders’
Expertise
1
(Nov.
8,
2018)
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2697281. In addition, some derivatives, such
as exchange-traded options and futures, are traded on exchanges.
5. See, e.g., BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, MONETARY & ECON. DEP’T, STATISTICAL
RELEASE: OTC DERIVATIVES STATISTICS AT END-DECEMBER 2015 2 (2016),
https://www.bis.org/publ/otc_hy1605.pdf; Dan Awrey, The Mechanisms of Derivatives Market
Efficiency, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1104, 1107 (2016) [hereinafter Awrey, Derivatives Market
Efficiency] (identifying $493 trillion in global derivatives markets); Colleen M. Baker, Regulating
the Invisible: The Case of Over-the-Counter Derivatives, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1287, 1299–
1300 (2010) (noting that OTC derivative markets vastly exceed exchange-traded markets in size).
6. BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, GLOBAL OTC DERIVATIVES MARKET tbl.D5,
https://www.bis.org/statistics/d5_1.pdf (last visited Aug. 23, 2020).
7. BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, TURNOVER OF OTC FOREIGN EXCHANGE INSTRUMENTS,
tbl.D11.1, https://www.bis.org/statistics/d11_1.pdf (last visited Aug. 23, 2020); see also Dagfinn
Rime & Andreas Schrimpf, The Anatomy of the Global FX Market Through the Lens of the 2013
Triennial Survey, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS Q. REV., at 27 (Dec. 2013),
https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1312e.pdf.
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foreign exchange (“FX”) benchmark, to value or price the vast majority of
transactions in those markets. Staggering sums of money end up tied to
benchmarks. In 2016, estimates of total notional exposure to a single
benchmark in a single region, the U.S. Dollar LIBOR, totaled about $200
trillion—ten times U.S. GDP that year.8 Correspondingly, minuscule
variations in a single benchmark will impact vast numbers of assets and
transactions for hundreds of millions of people, sophisticated and
unsophisticated. Instruments ranging from student loans and home or auto
mortgages, to complex hedges and synthetic derivatives, reference LIBOR,9
which has often been called “the world’s most important number.”10 The
impact of foreign currency benchmarks—the WM/Reuters FX rates—
extends into retirement funds and stock markets, where pension funds and
stock indices (such as the S&P 500 and Dow Jones Industrial Average) all
reference WM/Reuters FX rates in valuing investments and stocks
denominated in foreign currency.11
8. Second Report of the Alternative Reference Rates Committee (Mar. 5,
2018), https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/Microsites/arrc/files/2018/ARRC-Secondreport.com.
9. LIBOR is the most commonly used index for U.S. mortgages. For an Adjustable-Rate
Mortgage (ARM), What Are the Index and Margin, and How do They Work?, CONSUMER FIN. PROT.
BUREAU, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/ask-cfpb/for-an-adjustable-rate-mortgage-arm-whatare-the-index-and-margin-and-how-do-they-work-en-1949/ (last updated Nov. 15, 2019); see also
Gina-Gail S. Fletcher, Benchmark Regulation, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1929, 1931 (2017) (noting that
everything from consumer loans to commodity contracts and complex synthetic derivatives is tied
to LIBOR); Gabriel Rauterberg & Andrew Verstein, Index Theory: The Law, Promise and Failure
of Financial Indices, 30 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 30 (2013) [hereinafter Rauterberg & Verstein, Index
Theory] (tracing LIBOR’s dominance throughout short-term lending, from home and student loans
to corporate borrowing and speculation); Darrell Duffie & Piotr Dworczak, Robust Benchmark
Design 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 20540, 2018),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2505846 [hereinafter Duffie & Dworczak, Benchmark Design] (noting
“[l]iterally millions of different financial contracts, including interest rate swaps, futures, options,
variable rate bank loans, and mortgages, have payments that are contractually linked to LIBOR”).
10. See, e.g., David Enrich, Libor: A Eulogy for the World’s Most Important Number, WALL
ST. J. (July 27, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/libor-a-eulogy-for-the-worlds-most-importantnumber-1501170720; Matt Levine, Banks Will Miss Libor When It’s Gone, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 11,
2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-04-11/banks-will-miss-libor-when-it-sgone [hereinafter Levine, Banks Will Miss LIBOR]; Matt Phillips, The Most Important Number in
Finance Is Going Away. Wall St. Isn’t Prepared, N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/19/business/libor-future-2021-phase-out.html; Barry Ritholtz,
The
World’s
Most
Important
Number,
BLOOMBERG
(Apr.
13,
2018),
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-04-03/the-world-s-most-important-number.
11. See Dow Jones Averages: Methodology, S&P DOW JONES INDICES 12 (Apr. 2020),
https://us.spindices.com/documents/methodologies/methodology-dj-averages.pdf).
Economists
have written broadly on the microstructure of OTC markets and the role benchmarks play. See
Darrell Duffie, Piotr Dworczak & Haoxiang Zhu, Benchmarks in Search Markets, 72 J. FIN. 1983,
1984–86 (2017); Darrell Duffie & Jeremy C. Stein, Reforming LIBOR and Other Financial Market
Benchmarks, 29 J. ECON. PERSPS. 191, 195 (2015); Duffie & Dworczak, Benchmark Design, supra
note 9; Darrell Duffie, Nicolae Garleanu & Lasse Heje Pedersen, Over-the-Counter Markets (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 10816, 2004), https://ssrn.com/abstract=601118.
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These benchmarks are in trouble.12 Beginning around 2008, evidence
began emerging of manipulation and misconduct concerning one benchmark
after another: LIBOR, the WM/Reuters FX rates, and ISDAFIX (a reference
rate for interest rate swap rates), to name just a few.13 The harms have been
vast. Because so many transactions depend on benchmarks for payment or
valuation, evidence has emerged that benchmark manipulation may have
even exacerbated effects of the 2008 financial crisis.14 In the United States
alone, implicated banks have paid billions of dollars—including through
criminal penalties levied by the Justice Department, fines imposed by the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) and Federal Reserve
Bank, and civil settlements in the Southern District of New York.15 Their
employees have been terminated and sent to prison.16 Domestic and foreign
regulators have entered into onerous transition and reform schemes.17
A single benchmark, referenced throughout enormous markets, presents
a particularly tempting target for manipulation. With respect to LIBOR, the

12. Other scholars have identified susceptibilities to manipulation of benchmarks. See, e.g.,
Fletcher, supra note 9, at 1931–33 (assessing the merits of ex ante and ex post regulation of
benchmark-related wrongdoing); Rauterberg & Verstein, Index Theory, supra note 9, at 36–37
(developing a taxonomy of indices and noting their susceptibility to under- and nonproduction
because their promulgators are not able to internalize associated rewards); Andrew Verstein,
Benchmark Manipulation, 56 B.C.L. REV. 215, 230–33 (2015) [hereinafter Verstein, Benchmark
Manipulation] (examining reasons benchmarks are particularly profitable and tempting targets for
manipulation and arguing that financial market manipulation is growing increasingly synonymous
with benchmark manipulation).
13. See, e.g., Carrick Mollenkamp & Mark Whitehouse, Study Casts Doubt on Key Rate, WALL
ST. J. (May 29, 2008), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB121200703762027135.
14. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Reforming LIBOR: Wheatley Versus the Alternatives, 9 N.Y.U.
J. L. & BUS. 788, 798–99 (2013) (explaining that sustained underreporting of LIBOR may have
worsened the financial crisis because lower rates would result in borrowers paying less on their
loans, resulting in under-compensation for banks bearing the risks of such loans).
15. See, e.g., Portia Crowe, Wall Street Gets Slammed with $5.8 Billion in Fines for Rate
Rigging, BUS. INSIDER (May 20, 2015), https://www.businessinsider.com/libor-rigging-criminalcharges-and-fines-2015-5; Matt Levine, Bank FX Fine Scorecard (Follow Along at Home!),
BLOOMBERG (May 20, 2015), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2015-05-20/bank-finescorecard-follow-along-at-home-; Jill Treanor, Libor-Rigging Fines: A Timeline, GUARDIAN (Apr.
23, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/apr/23/libor-rigging-fines-a-timeline.
16. See, e.g., David Enrich, Former Trader Tom Hayes Sentenced to 14 Years for Libor
Rigging, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 3, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/tom-hayes-convicted-of-liborrigging-1438610483; Alexandra Stevenson, HSBC Bank Executives Face Charges in $3.5 Billion
Currency
Case,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
20,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/21/business/dealbook/hsbc-foreign-exchange-investigationcurrency.html.
17. See, e.g., Transition from LIBOR, N.Y. FED., ALT. REFERENCE RATES COMM.,
https://www.newyorkfed.org/arrc/sofr-transition (last visited Aug. 23, 2020); Staff Statement on
LIBOR Transition, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (July 12, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/news/publicstatement/libor-transition; Financial Benchmarks, FIN. STABILITY BD., https://www.fsb.org/workof-the-fsb/policy-development/additional-policy-areas/financial-benchmarks/ (last visited Aug. 23,
2020).

6

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 80:1

setting of which depended on thirteen or so large dealers’ self-reported costs
of borrowing, banks’ derivatives traders needed only to convince the banks’
LIBOR submitters to over- or underestimate the rate on any given day to
benefit those traders’ positions.18 This was successful because small
distortions in LIBOR could generate very large profits on hefty outstanding
positions for which payments depended on LIBOR. For example, in a single
quarter, a 25 basis point (0.25%) change in LIBOR could net $337 million in
interest revenue for JPMorgan, and $936 million for Citigroup.19 And if a
rate such as LIBOR were systematically overreported, interest rates on
everything from mortgages to derivatives would be systematically too high.20
Similarly, because the WM/Reuters FX benchmark reflected only a
sliver of interdealer transactions during a one-minute window of time around
4 p.m. each day, a would-be manipulator need not have controlled the global
supply of a currency; they needed only to tweak the benchmark rate to which
the global exchange rates are indexed. For example, if Citibank received an
order from a client who wished to purchase the New Zealand dollar (“NZD”)
at the WM/Reuters 4 p.m. benchmark rate, Citibank would purchase the NZD
and then sell it to the counterparty at the 4 p.m. fixing price. If Citibank could
ensure that other dealers did not interfere with its buying, then Citibank might
be able to buy the NZD in ways so as to push the 4 p.m. WM/Reuters rate up,
which could lead to Citibank then selling that NZD to its customer at an
inflated rate.
A few observations about these examples are worth noting. First, the
disparity between the size of the market snippet surveyed to create a
benchmark and the size of the market indexed to that benchmark—and thus
affected by manipulation—is enormous. Second, a few dealers seem to
possess outsize influence, both due to their involvement in the benchmarksetting process and as counterparties to the same transactions indexed to
those benchmarks. Finally, reform has proved tricky, not only because of
how deeply these benchmarks have permeated the markets, but due to the
lack of viable alternatives. As the President of the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York stated in a recent speech, “[c]ontracts that reference U.S. dollar

18. See, e.g., Press Release No. 15-499, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Deutsche Bank’s London
Subsidiary Agrees to Plead Guilty in Connection with Long-Running Manipulation of LIBOR (Apr.
23, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/deutsche-banks-london-subsidiary-agrees-plead-guiltyconnection-long-running-manipulation; Press Release No. 13-161, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, RBS
Securities Japan Limited Agrees to Plead Guilty in Connection with Long-Running Manipulation
of Libor Benchmark Interest Rates (Feb. 6, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/rbs-securitiesjapan-limited-agrees-plead-guilty-connection-long-running-manipulation-libor.
19. See Connan Snider & Thomas Youle, Does the LIBOR Reflect Banks’ Borrowing Costs?
10, 12 (Apr. 2, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1569603.
20. See, e.g., Rauterberg & Verstein, Index Theory, supra note 9, at 4.
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LIBOR continue to be written, which only serves to increase the level of
systemic risk.”21
Understanding how these structures arose and drawing insights to guide
future reform is this Article’s central analytical aim. Benchmarks such as
LIBOR or the WM/Reuters FX rate have become ubiquitous for an important
reason: they have substantially helped harmonize otherwise decentralized,
opaque OTC markets. These benefits fit the prevailing view in much of
financial regulation: because sophisticated market participants, through
wealth-maximizing behavior, tend to select towards structures that maximize
efficiency, aggregate social welfare is maximized, meaning that observed
equilibria are likely to be the most efficient equilibria.22
This Article makes the claim that this understanding is incomplete and
identifies a fundamental misalignment between what is privately optimal
(i.e., for individual parties to a given transaction), and what is socially
optimal (i.e., for the economy more broadly) in OTC markets. By
undertaking a structural analysis, this Article identifies significant distortions
that have resulted from treating benchmark rates as “one size fits all”: (a)
entrenched oligopolistic structures, (b) the temptation of manipulation and
weakened incentives to monitor wrongdoing, and (c) stagnation around a
suboptimal benchmark. It argues that the “natural” oligopoly observed
among powerful dealers in decentralized, opaque OTC markets, along with
network effects and accompanying path dependencies, have encouraged
inefficient lock-in and facilitated wrongdoing.
Suboptimal yet
“systemically” important benchmarks have resulted, with skyrocketing
switching costs for market participants and vanishing incentives to develop
better benchmarks.
Thus, this Article proposes an alternative competitive equilibrium—one
where multiple benchmarks compete. So long as a benchmark remains so
entrenched in an ecosystem dominated by powerful institutions, there is little
likelihood of innovation or competition from socially beneficial alternative
benchmarks, and market-based discipline will remain ineffective. Nor
should the persistence of certain dominant benchmarks be taken to indicate
their desirability. Simply because OTC markets have historically been
dominated by private ordering does not necessarily mean that the results of
such private orders are indicative of optimal or efficient outcomes.
21. John C. Williams, President and Chief Exec. Officer, FED. RESERVE BANK N.Y., Remarks
at
the
2019
U.S.
Treasury
Market
Conference
(Sept.
23,
2019),
https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2019/wil190923.
22. See generally, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 1–39 (1991); Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production,
Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972); R. H. Coase, The
Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937); Oliver Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93
YALE L.J. 1197 (1984).
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Existing reform proposals emphasize calculation methodology reform,
enforcement, or turning over responsibility to the government. All
overwhelmingly assume that a single benchmark will continue to dominate.
In doing so, these proposals ignore the deeper pathologies identified in this
Article and invite a repeat of the same problems that plague one-size-fits-all
benchmarks.
Calculation reform, while useful, comes at a cost. For example,
widening the sampling window for the WM/Reuters FX benchmark
calculation has introduced tracking error and potentially lowered the utility
of such a rate to end users. Moreover, total immunity to manipulation is
impossible, and attempting to achieve it would be exceedingly costly.
Enforcement and compliance will no doubt remain important. However, the
patchwork of fraud, manipulation, and antitrust regimes, and the difficulty of
measuring harm or disgorging profits pose significant obstacles to both ex
ante deterrence and ex post discipline. Nor do such proposals address the
problem of regulatory capture due to the systemic importance of a
benchmark. Relying on the government as a benchmark provider is also
problematic, and likely to be slow, cumbersome, and costly. Nor is there any
guarantee that the government would get it right.23
Competition among multiple benchmarks, by contrast, can benefit
participants market-wide by encouraging innovation, transparency, the
development of better information, and entry by more efficient providers.
Benchmarks would be nimbler, less systemically important, and less
tempting and more difficult to manipulate.
Additional benchmarks would, critically, significantly lower the cost for
end users of switching from one benchmark to another. Stagnation around a
single benchmark could be more easily avoided, and wealth-promoting
innovation and updating around existing and new benchmarks could occur
(with the proper incentives). Reduced hardwiring of a single benchmark
23. See infra Part IV.A. For example, in the U.S., regulators have settled on the secured
overnight financing rate (“SOFR”), a measurement of banks’ overnight borrowing rate (secured by
Treasury securities), as the sole designated LIBOR replacement. LIBOR had flaws, to be sure. But
so does SOFR: the markets for SOFR can be finicky and overly dependent on volatility spurts
related to funding market idiosyncrasies. SOFR, an average of past transactions, should also not
necessarily be viewed as a satisfactory substitute for LIBOR, a credit-sensitive term
rate. Importantly, SOFR is backward-looking, while LIBOR is forward-looking. For many
borrowers, interest rates pegged to future economic movements will be much more useful than those
that will always lag the market. These differences mean that, to fully transition to SOFR, market
participants will need to understand and calculate mathematical relationships between LIBOR and
SOFR for many contracts with payment obligations extending far into the future, an exceedingly
costly endeavor. Any issues will be exacerbated because banks, the main players in OTC markets,
are better off when they can match their lending revenue with their borrowing costs. LIBOR, which
measures banks’ cost of borrowing from each other, was actually an excellent rate at which to lend:
banks’ revenue from loans made at LIBOR would match their cost of borrowing from each other,
allowing a match between assets and liabilities.

2020]

BENCHMARK COMPETITION

9

would also make market discipline more effective by reducing not only the
temptation to manipulate (by lowering the upside), but also a benchmark’s
systemic impact.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I explicates the social functions
of financial trading markets, introduces OTC markets, and describes their
basic dealer-mediated structure. Dealers’ expertise, superior information,
and lower cost of providing liquidity in bespoke, decentralized markets have
resulted in their natural dominance. As a byproduct of their market-making
business, dealers amass information and acquire expertise, creating a kind of
“natural” oligopoly. Part II explores the “private” disciplining structures in
OTC markets and how benchmarks can exert radical standardizing effects
and generate efficiencies and social value for a wide swath of OTC market
participants. Part III considers the limits of such structures, seeking to
understand how dealer-promulgated benchmarks then benefit from network
effects and path dependencies that promote inefficient pooling around the
“default” benchmark. Negative consequences can snowball: oligopolies can
entrench; “systemically” important benchmarks may result in the same way
a bank can become systemically important; incentives to monitor
wrongdoing can weaken; and manipulation may seem particularly tempting,
especially when dealers both set a benchmark and are the counterparties to
transactions that reference that benchmark. Part IV discusses implications
and avenues for reform. So long as a benchmark remains so entrenched in
an ecosystem dominated by powerful institutions, innovation or competition
from socially beneficial alternative benchmarks will be unlikely, and marketbased discipline will lack credibility. Thus, in contrast to existing reform
proposals, which overwhelmingly assume that a single benchmark will
continue to dominate, this Article advocates for a more fundamental
approach. An alternative competitive equilibrium is proposed—one where
multiple benchmarks compete.
Benefits of introducing additional
benchmarks and encouraging competition are considered, as are mechanisms
for transition. A brief conclusion follows.
I. OVER-THE-COUNTER MARKETS
While the focus of this Article is on benchmark-based OTC markets, I
will first discuss OTC markets more broadly, their structures, and their
capacity for generating social value. Understanding these structures provides
important background for understanding the emergence of financial
benchmarks.
OTC markets are dealer markets, which means that a dealer (such as
Goldman Sachs) will be the counterparty to every transaction. Dealers play
critical roles in matching parties, facilitating transactions, and lowering
search costs that might prevent participation in the markets at all. Particular
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attention will be paid to the consequences of dealer domination: as a
byproduct of this role, dealers amass information and acquire expertise,
creating a kind of “natural” oligopoly.
A. Social Value of OTC Markets
At their broadest, financial trading markets—regardless of structure—
serve important social purposes. Beyond simply generating wealth for
powerful players within them, properly functioning markets funnel
participants’ profit-seeking activities toward actions that generate social
value and help allocate real economic resources to projects that benefit the
economy.24 The mechanisms through which this occurs differ from market
to market, but in general, the more accurate prices are and the more liquid
markets are, the more smoothly this process works.25
If properly functioning, OTC markets can enhance the efficiency with
which resources are allocated.26 Most importantly, they provide economical
and flexible means through which firms and funds can efficiently hedge risk.
Of course, improperly functioning OTC markets—like any market—will do
the opposite. At their worst, OTC markets can facilitate speculation,
leverage, and socially harmful activities, which can have disastrous
consequences for the economy and arguably played a role in previous market
24. Consider the market for equities—stocks. Secondary trading markets for equities, such as
the NYSE, incentivize information discovery about the value of corporations through relatively
well-understood mechanisms. As traders seek to profit off of information, buying if they believe
the stock is undervalued, and selling if they believe it is overvalued, stock prices move toward levels
that better reflect available information. As more information is impounded into prices through
trades, prices act as a signal for investors to further direct their capital accordingly. For further
detail, see generally, FOX, GLOSTEN & RAUTERBERG, supra note 1.
25. See, e.g., Merritt B. Fox, Lawrence R. Glosten & Gabriel V. Rauterberg, Informed Trading
and Its Regulation, 43 J. CORP. L. 817, 832–35 (2018). Price accuracy refers to the degree in which
a price reflects the value of the asset. Liquidity is a multidimensional concept that captures the cost
of trading. It touches on availability of the trade, possible prices, ease of transacting, and time
required. Additional considerations also bear on an evaluation of the desirability of any practice in
financial markets: the real resources consumed (e.g., personnel and infrastructure), and the
practice’s effect on favorable innovation, for example. The more accurate prices are, and the more
liquid markets are, the more easily resources can be directed to projects that generate the most social
value, and the better the markets are able to promote core aspects of social welfare. Tying into the
Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis, or the idea that prices in the equities market reflect all
available information, this underlies many regulatory goals, a disclosure-based legal regime, and
prevailing views on corporate governance and enforcement (e.g., the use of fraud-on-the-market
presumption). Id.; see also Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market
Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984).
26. See, e.g., Awrey, Derivatives Market Efficiency, supra note 5, at 1122 (explaining that
derivatives markets, functioning well and embedding price expectations, enhance market
efficiency); Joel Hasbrouck & Richard M. Levich, FX Market Metrics: New Findings Based on CLS
Bank Settlement Data 3, 35 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 23206, 2017),
https://www.nber.org/papers/w23206.pdf (noting the importance of liquidity to international
currency markets and international trade).
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crashes.27 Below, I provide an example of a socially useful OTC transaction.
Because it is customizable, a swap (a kind of OTC derivative) can provide a
precise hedge for the idiosyncratic business risk that a particular firm faces.
One of the largest risks to the profitability of an airline’s business is
rising jet fuel prices. For example, if jet fuel prices rise, Delta Air Lines’s
profits will decline. In order to manage this risk, or hedge its exposure, Delta
might enter into a jet fuel swap. Such a swap will ensure that rising or falling
fuel prices will not cripple Delta’s profitability. Structured as a fixed-forfloating swap (one party pays a fixed price in return for a floating, or market,
price over some period of time), if fuel prices rise, Delta receives payment
that directly offsets the higher prices it may have to pay in the market for
fuel. As a result, Delta becomes indifferent to otherwise volatile changes in
fuel costs. In this way, swaps can be tailored to hedge a multitude of other
commodity risks, interest rate risks (the risk that a company’s borrowing
costs rise), foreign exchange rate risks, and so forth. Indeed, Delta’s 2019
second quarter financial report makes note of derivative contracts (both
exchange-traded and OTC) used to hedge fuel price risk, interest rate risk,
and foreign exchange risk.28
This example illustrates the usefulness of OTC products in allocating
risks onto parties better able to bear them.29 The above swap was particularly
useful because it could be precisely customized. Delta could arrange for
payment and delivery on the same dates on which it would need to obtain
fuel. To cite an example from a different industry, an executive at
MillerCoors has stated: “[We] use over-the-counter swaps to precisely match
the timing and prices of our complex manufacturing and distribution
process . . . . [W]e match our OTC swaps for aluminum with the actual use
of cans over the same exact timeframe.”30 End users of such OTC products

27. This is a common criticism leveled at OTC markets. See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, Derivatives
and the Legal Origin of the 2008 Credit Crisis, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 1, 3–4, 22–29 (2011) (arguing
that the 2008 credit crisis directly resulted from removing the Commodities Futures Modernization
Act’s ban on speculative trading in OTC derivatives).
28. Delta Air Lines, Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) 12 (June 30, 2019),
http://d18rn0p25nwr6d.cloudfront.net/CIK-0000027904/43093a3a-581e-4dc0-8f23499bb7031e64.pdf.
29. Kathryn Judge, Investor-Driven Financial Innovation, 8 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 291, 322
(2018) (contrasting reallocation of risk through financial market activity with hedging exogenous
risks with derivatives).
30. Assessing the Regulatory, Economic, and Market Implications of the Dodd-Frank
Derivatives Title, Hearing Before the Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 52 (2011) (statement of
Craig
Reiners,
Director
of
Risk
Management,
MillerCoors),
https://play.google.com/books/reader?id=kFZGAQAAMAAJ&hl=en&pg=GBS.PA52; see also
Bruce Tuckman, Derivatives: Understanding Their Usefulness and Their Role in the Financial
Crisis,
28
J.
APPLIED
CORP.
FIN.
62,
63–64
(2016),
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jacf.12159.
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range from Delta Air Lines to institutional portfolio managers31 to sovereign
states,32 and such transactions are prevalent throughout a wide range of
industries.33 This kind of customization34 can help a company alleviate large
components of business risk35 that might otherwise jeopardize its operations
or make its day-to-day continuation significantly more uncertain,36 or lower
certain kinds of risk in an investment portfolio.37

31. See, e.g., Momtchil Pojarliev & Richard M. Levich, Should Investors Avoid or Seek Out
Currency Risk? How to Resolve a Long-Standing Puzzle, 2 J. FIN. PERSPS. (2014).
32. See Henry T.C. Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives: The Causes of Informational Failure and
the Promise of Regulatory Incrementalism, 102 YALE L.J. 1457, 1466 n.39 (1993) (noting that as
early as 1991, governments have been party to hundreds of billions of dollars’ worth of interest rate
and currency swaps); John Kiff, Uri Ron, & Shafiq Ebrahim, The Federal Government’s Use of
Interest Rate Swaps and Currency Swaps, BANK OF CAN. R. 23–24 (2000–01) (noting Canada’s
billions of dollars’ worth of interest rate swaps and currency swaps used to manage foreign currency
risk); Benn Steil, Central Bank Currency Swaps Tracker, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 1, 4
(Nov. 5, 2019), https://www.cfr.org/international-finance/central-bank-currency-swaps-sincefinancial-crisis/p36419#!/ (noting the importance of U.S. Federal Reserve swaps in responding to
the 2007 crisis).
33. See, e.g., Apple Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 26–27 (Sept. 28, 2019),
http://d18rn0p25nwr6d.cloudfront.net/CIK-0000320193/1a919118-a594-44f3-92f04ecca47b1a7d.pdf; General Electric Company, Annual Report (Form 10-K) 147–48 (Dec. 31,
2018),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/40545/000004054519000014/ge10-k2018.htm
(reporting $1.5 billion in derivatives hedges); UnitedHealth Group Inc., Annual Report (Form 10K)
46
(Dec.
31,
2018),
https://www.unitedhealthgroup.com/content/dam/UHG/PDF/investors/2018/UNH-Q4-2018Form-10-K.pdf) (reporting $14 billion of assets and $9 billion of liabilities with variable interest
rates, directly or via interest rate swaps); The Value of Derivatives, INT’L SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES
ASS’N (2014), https://www.isda.org/a/qJEDE/isda-final-2014.pdf (discussing how firms across a
multitude of industries rely on OTC derivatives to manage business and financial risks, enabling
them to better serve their clients).
34. In a three-month study of interest rate derivatives, over 10,500 traded combinations of
product, currency, and tenor were observed (roughly 4,300 combinations just once). Michael
Fleming, John Jackson, Ada Li, Asani Sarkar & Patricia Zobel, An Analysis of OTC Interest Rate
Derivatives Transactions: Implications for Public Reporting 3 (Mar. 2012), FED. RES. BANK N.Y.
Staff Report No. 557, https://ssrn.com/abstract=2030461.
35. This is especially true for the component of firm-specific risk that cannot be diversified
away. See, e.g., Edward G. Fox, Merritt B. Fox & Ronald J. Gilson, Economic Crisis and the
Integration of Law and Finance: The Impact of Volatility Spikes, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 325, 330
(2016) (noting differences between firm-specific—or idiosyncratic—risk and market-wide—or
systemic—risk).
36. This is not to say that there are not costs or tradeoffs to OTC market usage. Greater
flexibility in customization usually entails greater risk, in counterparty risk, default risk, and simple
valuation risk. See Hu, supra note 32, at 1465–67 (describing benefits to derivatives, such as
lowered transaction costs and cheaper and more flexible risk management); Kiff, Ron & Ebrahim,
supra note 32, at 24 (explaining that swaps are useful because they are private and customizable,
but also have counterparty risk and lock in costs).
37. For example, economists have modeled the beneficial effects of both passive and active
hedging of currency risk in portfolios, demonstrating that they reduce volatility and generate better
returns. See, e.g., Pojarliev & Levich, supra note 31, at 2, (arguing for institutional investments in
currency because they are resilient, liquid, and tend to be imperfectly correlated with other aspects
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B. OTC Market Structures
This Part lays out the attendant structures in OTC trading markets and
highlights an important aspect of transactions such as the example described
for Delta: the importance of intermediaries. Usually large banks such as
Goldman Sachs or other large market-making entities, dealers serve
particularly crucial functions in OTC markets due to (a) such markets’ lack
of a centralized coordination mechanism for transactions, such as a limit
order book; and (b) parties’ needs for complex, bespoke instruments and
transactions.
This Part will explain that as OTC markets have expanded, these dealers
have grown even more important, attaining a “natural” oligopoly of sorts
through the superior information and expertise acquired as a byproduct of
their market-making business. First, I discuss dealers’ roles in providing
liquidity. Then, I focus on the information asymmetries that persist in these
markets. Finally, this Part explores the oligopolistic nature of dealers’ roles
in OTC markets.
1. Dealer-Mediated Liquidity
Dealers provide liquidity in OTC markets. OTC markets lack
coordinated or centralized sources, such as a limit order book, through which
a would-be participant could undertake its own search for a counterparty or
compare the quotes offered by counterparties.38
A limit order book, such as those featured on equities exchanges,
consolidates the best executable price quotes (prices at which buyers and
sellers are willing to enter into transactions) and makes them available to
market participants.39 Executions take place when a buyer is willing to pay
a price that is equal to or higher than the lowest sale offer, or when a seller is
willing to accept a price that is equal to or lower than the highest bid.40
In a limit order book market, any entity can be the counterparty to a
transaction. The counterparty is largely random and will be whoever posts a
price at which another is willing to transact. In equities markets today, more
often than not this is a high-frequency trader.41 By contrast, in a dealer
of the market, including downturns and other cyclical events, as their values depend on relative
economic strength).
38. See, e.g., Awrey, Derivatives Market Efficiency, supra note 5, at 1107–08, 1133.
39. See FOX, GLOSTEN AND RAUTERBERG, supra note 1. For many years, there existed
“specialists” on the stock exchanges, who were designated “market makers” and stood ready to
provide quotes on a continuous basis. These no longer exist. (Anyone can provide liquidity on a
stock exchange today.)
See LARRY HARRIS, TRADING AND EXCHANGES: MARKET
MICROSTRUCTURE FOR PRACTITIONERS 494 (2003).
40. See FOX, GLOSTEN AND RAUTERBERG, supra note 1, at 11–32.
41. See id. at 95–130.
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market, which OTC markets are, a dealer will always be the counterparty to
each transaction. But the limit order book model, as we will see, in which
anyone can provide liquidity or act as a counterparty to a trade, has limited
viability for markets where transactions are highly complex or in which risks
are bespoke and idiosyncratic.
In the Delta example, because Delta has a business risk exposure to
rising jet fuel prices, Delta is an end user of a jet fuel swap, or OTC
derivative. Rather than try and find a counterparty with the exact opposite
exposure to fuel costs on matching future dates and in identical future
amounts, Delta would most likely enter into a swap with a dealer such as
Goldman Sachs. Goldman could then enter into additional swaps with other
end users, overall maintaining minimal exposure itself.42 In this way, both
Delta and the would-be counterparty gain perfect hedges, while Goldman
bears only minimal risk (and no business risk) that it is able to eliminate
because it is counterparty to a huge volume of such transactions, earning fees
on these transactions.43
Goldman provides valuable flexibility, and likely at significantly lower
cost than, for example, an oil refinery might. Searching for a refinery with
the same precise opposite exposure would also be expensive and timeconsuming, meaning firms might settle for imperfect hedges, leaving varying
amounts of risk unmanaged. Further, another end user (as counterparty)
would most likely exhibit idiosyncratic settlement risk or default risk—risks
that are exacerbated by the future-oriented nature of swaps and hedging
instruments that contemplate continuing payment obligations of both parties
over some length of time.44 Goldman is a far less risky counterparty.
Dealers, who have superior resources and who are in the business of
managing risk, are naturally better positioned to take on a counterparty role.
In this way, dealers can contribute to market efficiencies by allowing
risk to be allocated more efficiently.45 Dealers act as market makers. By

42. See also Hu, supra note 32, at 1466–68; Sivaprakasam Sivakumar & Anita Mathew,
Currency Swaps: An Instrument of International Finance, 21 VIKALPA 3, 4–5 (1996),
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0256090919960201 (noting the transition from
intermediaries bringing counterparties together to intermediaries acting as counterparties to the
transactions themselves, reducing counterparty risk for end users).
43. See, e.g., Tuckman, supra note 30 at 63–64 (noting that the variability and idiosyncrasies
of many end users’ needs (mismatched buyers and sellers) means that liquidity providers play
important roles, providing immediacy and earning fees for the risks of doing so).
44. See Awrey, Derivatives Market Efficiency, supra note 5, at 1126–28.
45. See Rauterberg & Verstein, Index Theory, supra note 9, at 12; see also Lukas Menkhoff,
Lucio Sarno, Maik Schmeling & Andreas Schrimpf, Information Flows in Foreign Exchange
Markets: Dissecting Customer Currency Trades, 71 J. FIN. 601, 602 (2016) (noting that large
dealers allow differing parties to share risk); Semyon Malamud & Andreas Schrimpf, An
Intermediation-Based Model of Exchange Rates 4–5 (Bank for Int’l Settlements, Working Paper
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packaging transactions for clients and being willing to take either side of a
trade, dealers usually eliminate the resulting risk through offsetting
transactions with other clients or other dealers.46 Access to a liquid
interdealer market can also help hedge such exposure.47 Without ready
intermediaries, search in an OTC market might be extremely costly.48
2. Informational Advantages
OTC market structures also tend to concentrate superior information in
the hands of these same dealers. There is little price transparency, price
discrimination persists, and larger dealers are better informed as a result of
their market-making activities.49
Prices for transactions executed in an OTC market are known to the
participants in any given transaction, but are rarely disseminated any
further.50 End users must approach counterparties sequentially and engage
in bilateral negotiating.51 Information is obtained only by requesting quotes
from different dealers, which takes time and still does not necessarily tell end
users anything about recent prices or the desirability of any given quote.52
And, once a quote is agreed upon, it is difficult to monitor execution.53
743, 2018), https://www.bis.org/publ/work743.pdf (observing that markups may decrease due to
the overall lower risk exposure resulting from successful intermediation).
46. See Dan Awrey, Complexity, Innovation, and the Regulation of Modern Financial Markets,
2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 235, 268 (2012) [hereinafter Awrey, Complexity].
47. For example, in the foreign exchange markets, because dealers prefer to keep “flat” books,
after taking one side of a transaction with a customer, that dealer will hedge the resulting exposure
on the opposite side through the interdealer market. See Michael R. King, Carol Osler & Dagfinn
Rime, Foreign Exchange Market Structure, Players and Evolution 14 (Norges Bank Working Paper
No. 2011/10, 2011), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1935858 [hereinafter King, Osler & Rime, FX
Market Structure].
48. If the costs are great enough, entities may abstain from participating at all. Thus, these costs
act as a sort of wedge that potentially reduces gains from trade or results in risk remaining unhedged.
49. This is another crucial aspect in which OTC markets differ from exchange markets: in order
for the price discovery mechanism to work smoothly in exchange markets, a multitude of
regulations ensure relatively “fair” access to markets, prices, and information. In exchange markets,
no single entity—or concentrated group of powerful entities—controls the price discovery
mechanism. Anyone can be a market maker, and anyone can be trading on information. Overall,
the more information seeking there is, the more accurate prices tend to be. See generally FOX,
GLOSTEN AND RAUTERBERG, supra note 1, at 33–58; HARRIS, supra note 39.
50. There are some exceptions, for example, post-trade reporting through TRACE in the U.S.
bond markets. See Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (“TRACE”), FIN. INDUS.
REGULATORY AUTH., https://www.finra.org/filing-reporting/trace (last visited Feb. 2, 2020).
51. See Awrey, Derivatives Market Efficiency, supra note 5, at 1133; Duffie, Garleanu &
Pedersen, supra note 11, at 1; Glode & Opp, supra note 4, at 3.
52. See Awrey, Derivatives Market Efficiency, supra note 5, at 1133. Indeed, certain banks
have been fined for adding “silent” markups on quotes without informing their clients. See, e.g.,
Plea Agreement at 3–9, United States v. JPMorgan Chase, 2015 WL 2441398 (D. Conn. May 20,
2015) No. 3:15CR79(SRU).
53. See Awrey, Derivatives Market Efficiency, supra note 5, at 1128.
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On the flip side, dealers amass information, almost passively.54
Customer orders provide dealers with a constant stream of information.55 In
foreign exchange markets, for example, empirical evidence confirms the
informational advantages enjoyed by the largest dealers.56 Moreover, the
general opacity of transactions enables dealers to engage in price
discrimination and profit from their superior information.57 It is well
documented that OTC markets see a variety of prices paid by differing clients
for the same asset, making OTC markets more profitable for dealers.58 Price
accuracy can suffer, especially as compared to an exchange on which assets
are continuously traded, and where price transparency, liquidity, and
immediacy limit the markups that a dealer can charge.59 Indeed, work has
demonstrated that centralized, continuous trading multi-dealer platforms can
help eliminate discriminatory pricing and equalize spreads paid by clients
regardless of sophistication level.60
These informational advantages grow as transactions and products
attain increasing heterogeneity and complexity. Returning to the previous
example, Delta has a specific set of exposures it needs to hedge and a specific
business risk profile. MillerCoors has a completely different one. Other
54. See id. at 1143–44.
55. See, e.g., Menkhoff, Sarno, Schmeling & Schrimpf, supra note 45, at 602 (finding that FX
orders incorporate information about future rates).
56. See, e.g., Michael R. King, Carol L. Osler & Dagfinn Rime, The Market Microstructure
Approach to Foreign Exchange: Looking Back and Looking Forward, 38 J. INT’L MONEY & FIN.
95, 109–11 (2013) (discussing how those with large customers are better informed); Martin D.D.
Evans & Dagfinn Rime, Microstructure of Foreign Exchange Markets 3 (Norges Bank Working
Paper
No.
6/2019,
2019),
https://www.norges-bank.no/en/news-events/newspublications/Papers/Working-Papers/2019/62019/ (noting in FX markets, these informational
advantages most significantly come from customer orders, concentrated in large dealers); King,
Osler & Rime, FX Market Structure, supra note 47, at 16 (discussing a study of FX dealers’ order
flow concluding that larger dealers are better informed than smaller dealers).
57. See, e.g., Harald Hau, Peter Hoffmann, Sam Langfield & Yannick Timmer, Discriminatory
Pricing of Over-the-Counter Derivatives 1–2 (Swiss Fin. Inst. Research Paper No. 17-70, 2017),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3099089 (finding that less sophisticated clients pay the most in FX
derivatives markets, while client sophistication does not affect spreads on multi-dealer request-forquote platforms).
58. See DARRELL DUFFIE, DARK MARKETS: ASSET PRICING AND INFORMATION
TRANSMISSION IN OVER-THE-COUNTER MARKETS (PRINCETON LECTURES IN FINANCE) 12 (2012).
Dealers charge wider spreads when they have more information vis-à-vis their counterparties. See,
e.g., Hau, Hoffmann, Langfield & Timmer, supra note 57, at 1–2. Similarly, spreads quoted
between dealers in the interdealer market are usually narrower than those quoted to customers. See
King, Osler & Rime, FX Market Structure, supra note 47, at 15–16.
59. See Awrey, Complexity, supra note 46, at 268 (arguing that the dealer-centric structure in
OTC markets has significantly impeded transparent pricing); Kathryn Judge, Intermediary Influence
82 U. CHI. L. REV. 573, 615–16, 625 (2015) [hereinafter Judge, Intermediary Influence] (noting that
prices in OTC markets may be less accurate than exchange-traded ones).
60. See Hau, Hoffmann, Langfield & Timmer, supra note 57, at 2 (finding in the FX market,
the rents extracted by dealers with superior information are not observed in multi-dealer request for
quote platforms).

2020]

BENCHMARK COMPETITION

17

companies, portfolio managers, and end users will have other idiosyncratic
needs and risks. Dealers, with expertise in multiple kinds of exposures and
assets, will invest in the resources and models to understand and value
complex transactions and instruments, acquiring even greater expertise as the
market evolves.61 This reinforces an earlier observation: the limit order book
model, in which anyone can provide liquidity or act as a counterparty to a
trade, has limited viability for markets where transactions are highly complex
or in which risks are bespoke and idiosyncratic. This also helps clarify the
value added by dealers: they are much better positioned to provide hedging
instruments to end users such as Delta. Thus, we arrive at a basic,
unavoidable trade-off: intermediaries add significant value by structuring
such transactions, but doing so also amplifies those same intermediaries’
substantial informational advantages vis-à-vis end users or clients.62
3. “Natural” Oligopoly
A natural monopoly occurs when a single supplier of services or
products naturally dominates because it can more efficiently supply the
market than its competitors can.63 While the antitrust literature contains a
rich debate as to such structures, for our purposes it is sufficient to note its
contours.64 Naturally arising monopolies or oligopolies result from supplyside economies of scale, rather than demand characteristics.65 Understanding
the structural profile of OTC markets—their dealer-mediated liquidity and
persistent information asymmetries—as a “natural” oligopoly of dealers can
provide valuable insights.
Intuitively, it should not be too surprising that the markets described
above tend to exhibit some characteristics of an oligopoly. Certain
efficiencies can be achieved by concentrating activity within large, expert
dealers who can provide near perfect hedges while posing very little
counterparty risk to an end user. End users in OTC markets usually have
one-off, idiosyncratic needs, with a somewhat fixed cost of doing business in
OTC markets.66 Delta’s cost of negotiating additional jet fuel swaps may
61. For example, in the foreign exchange markets, customer demand for electronic platforms
has driven investment in technology, which is expensive and can prove unprofitable for dealers with
smaller market share. This phenomenon may be exacerbated if dealers are incentivized to invest in
transactions that enable high-fee, more complex products. See Judge, Intermediary Influence, supra
note 59, at 627.
62. See id. at 625.
63. See Richard A. Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REV. 548, 548
(1969). Telecommunications or public utility industries are examples of natural monopolies. Id.
64. See generally id.
65. See id. at 548.
66. See, e.g., Matt Levine, The Libor Change Is Coming, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 27, 2019),
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-08-27/the-libor-change-is-coming [hereinafter
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diminish after the negotiation of an initial one, but that diminishment cannot
compare to the economies of scale that a dealer such as Goldman benefits
from across its entire swaps business. For Goldman, packaging additional
swaps carries very low marginal additional cost and effort, and maintaining
hedges across its book ensures that Goldman is largely indifferent to the
additional minor risk taken on in any given single transaction.67 This also
enables Goldman to charge lower prices than a competitor with fewer
resources might be able to.
Thus, it should not be a surprise that dealer activity in OTC markets has
grown more and more concentrated. Over time, a small group of very
powerful dealers has grown to represent a disproportionate proportion of
counterparties to transactions.68 For instance, a study at the end of 2010
found that over 96% of the outstanding $217 trillion in derivatives contracts
had one of the largest five banks as counterparty (Goldman Sachs, Bank of
America, Citi, JPMorgan Chase, and Wells Fargo).69 Contrast this to
exchange-driven equities markets, where trading activity is dispersed
throughout the public, and liquidity could be provided by anyone.70
End users’ ability to seek out a counterparty that is not one of the leading
dealers is severely limited, and dealers acquire key “positional advantages,”
including powerful relationships among themselves.71 A feedback loop
results, through which increased concentration fuels dealers’ knowledge and
expertise relative to clients, the markets, and even regulators.72 Dealers have
Levine, The Libor Change Is Coming] (noting that there are “all sorts of reasons” that a bank’s client
may have for entering into or exiting derivatives positions).
67. See, e.g., id. (“You, meanwhile, are a bank; your derivatives trades are all hedged, and you
don’t care unduly about staying in or getting out of any particular trade.”).
68. Market power is not an uncontroversial concept, and scholars do disagree as to its
measurement, in particular, whether market concentration suffices as a proxy. See generally Awrey,
Complexity, supra note 46; Louis Kaplow, Why (Ever) Define Markets?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 437
(2010); Gregory J. Werden, Why (Ever) Define Markets? An Answer to Professor Kaplow, 78
ANTITRUST L.J. 729 (2013).
69. See Judge, Intermediary Influence, supra note 59, at 619. These are common statistics. See
Awrey, Complexity, supra note 46, at 268 (noting that in 2010, the fourteen largest dealers were
counterparties to 82% of global outstanding notional in swaps) (citing David Mengle, Concentration
of OTC Derivatives Among Major Dealers 1 (ISDA Research Notes, no. 4, 2010),
http://www.isda.org/researchnotes/pdf/ConcentrationRN_4-10.pdf).
70. See generally FOX, GLOSTEN AND RAUTERBERG, supra note 1; HARRIS, supra note 39. In
fact, a key motivation for instituting the trade-through rule in equities markets was to foster
competition: by mandating that orders must execute at the best available price regardless of which
exchange that price is found at (i.e., if NYSE receives an order but the best available price is on
NASDAQ, NYSE must route that order to NASDAQ), a small exchange, so long as it has the best
price, is guaranteed order flow.
71. See Judge, Intermediary Influence, supra note 59, at 577–78, 617–18 (explaining that these
can be characterized by formal or informal relationships, in-house expertise over bespoke
transactions, control over a trading vehicle, etc.).
72. See id. at 577–78.
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the benefit of volume, they often have the financial resources to invest in
complex models that can more accurately value the relevant assets and their
markets,73 and by simple consequence of acting as counterparty to the vast
majority of transactions, information acquisition about the asset and the
market in question is almost a passive consequence of their business.74
Moreover, the opacity of prices and executions ensures that this information
is not disseminated to their customers.
OTC markets—through the basic dealer-mediated nature of transactions
and the lack of a centralized coordination or pricing mechanism—have thus
proven particularly susceptible to oligopolistic domination by a few large
players. The next Part seeks to understand the role of benchmarks within
such markets.
II. BENCHMARK HARMONIZATION
As illustrated by the above discussion, the claim that OTC markets are
completely unstructured and a financial free-for-all would be inaccurate.
They have, instead, in ad hoc form loosely organized themselves around
dealers’ activities. This Part explores the degree to which standardization has
been achieved by financial benchmarks such as LIBOR, ISDAFIX and FX,
and how, as a result, they have grown to dominate default transaction choices
in OTC markets.
Generally speaking, left to their own devices, private markets can
evolve in efficient ways. This is because actors are naturally incentivized to
acquire expertise and invest in structures that minimize transaction costs and
maximize any resulting gain.75 This reflects a dominant view in much of
corporate and financial legal thinking,76 and I will turn to it more fully in Part
III.D. For now, it is sufficient to note that this understanding has some
explanatory power for the dealer-mediated structures in OTC markets.
Without dealers, many of the costs to transacting in OTC markets identified
above might otherwise deter would-be investors from participating in such
markets at all, resulting in risk that remains unhedged. But as we will see,
dependence on the alignment between the market and its most powerful
participants—dealers—for socially beneficial innovation can be a risky and
problematic endeavor.

73. See King, Osler & Rime, FX Market Structure, supra note 47, at 29 (explaining that because
FX trading is unprofitable for small dealers due to the cost of investing in trading technology, the
share of trading concentrated in the few largest banks had grown to 40% by 2010).
74. See Awrey, Derivatives Market Efficiency, supra note 5, at 1143–44.
75. See Dan Awrey, The Limits of Private Ordering Within Modern Financial Markets, 34 REV.
BANKING & FIN. L. 183, 191–93 (2014) [hereinafter Awrey, Private Ordering].
76. See supra note 22.
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A. Benchmark Introduction
Financial benchmarks’ standardizing effects in OTC markets have been
profound, especially with respect to price accuracy and liquidity, allowing
end users and dealers alike to capture the resulting gains from lowered
information asymmetries. All OTC transactions—indeed, all financial
transactions—hinge on price or payment terms, whether the immediate price
of an asset, the schedule of payments for some time into the future, or some
yet-to-be-determined payoffs conditioned on future circumstances. Without
benchmarks, negotiating each such price term can be costly, time-consuming,
and inefficient. End users might spend valuable resources doing so, pay
higher or worse prices that reduce or even eliminate the benefit to entering
into the transaction at all, or simply leave the market, potentially leaving risk
unmanaged. This Part focuses on how benchmarks can significantly reduce
these costs.
Some market segments rely more on benchmarks for coordination and
informational transparency benefits than others. These include foreign
exchange markets, commodities, and those for certain interest rate products.
Three examples of such benchmarks—LIBOR, FX, and ISDAFIX—are
described below.
LIBOR originated out of frustration with the rampant nonuniformity in
the early days of obtaining loans (parties frequently disagreed as to interest
rates, where to obtain reference numbers, and whom to obtain them from).77
U.K. banks eventually requested that the British Bankers Association
(“BBA”) standardize a means to calculate “the interest rates on syndicated
loans.”78 This became LIBOR, which proved hugely useful in calculating
banks’ funding costs easily and cheaply.79 By lending at LIBOR, which
estimated their own costs of borrowing, banks were able to better match their
lending revenue to their borrowing costs.80 By 2012, LIBOR was reported
for ten currencies and at fifteen maturities for each.81 LIBOR has become
the benchmark used globally to set interest rates—and through its
incorporation, the benchmark used to “price” borrowing costs of entities all
over the world.82 Frequently referred to as the “world’s most important

77. See Rauterberg & Verstein, Transnational Regulation, supra note 4, at 25 (citing Jeffrey B.
Golden, Setting Standards in the Evolution of Swap Documentation, 13 INT’L FIN. L. REV. 18
(1994)) (noting the contentiousness among market participants in deciding reference rates).
78. See Rauterberg & Verstein, Index Theory, supra note 9, at 30.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 16.
82. Id. at 3, 11; Verstein, Benchmark Manipulation, supra note 12, at 261 (noting ambiguities
in the term “price”).
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number,”83 referencing or relying on LIBOR is ubiquitous throughout the
swap markets and debt markets—where it impacts everything from student
loans and mortgages to complex hedges and synthetic derivatives (statistics
pegged over $360 trillion to be indexed to LIBOR in 2008).84
In 1994, WM/Reuters introduced Closing Spot Rates as a benchmark
for currency prices.85 Calculated for over 150 currency pairs,86 the most
important rates are those calculated at 4 p.m. London time, daily.87
WM/Reuters FX rates have grown hugely influential in markets worldwide.
The value of standardizing currency exchange rates so that portfolio
valuations could be more easily and accurately measured has been enormous.
WM/Reuters FX rates are referenced throughout currency derivatives and
commonly used to calculate the value of foreign-denominated assets.88 This
is especially important, as most major equity and bond indices (the S&P 500
and Dow Jones, for example) as well as pension funds and mutual funds rely
on the WM/Reuters FX rates to determine the value of foreign-denominated
assets.89 The daily turnover of these instruments has been estimated at $5
trillion.90
In 1998, the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (“ISDA”)
established the ISDAFIX, now known as the ICE Swap Rate, to act as a
reference rate for interest rate swap rates. ISDAFIX is less widely known
but has had powerful standardizing effects in the market for swap derivatives.
Published daily, ISDAFIX indicated the mid-market rate for the fixed leg of
83. See supra note 10.
84. See Duffie & Dworczak, Benchmark Design, supra note 9, at 2; Fletcher, supra note 9, at
1931; Rauterberg & Verstein, Index Theory, supra note 9, at 3, 30.
85. WM/Reuters FX Benchmarks: Spot, Forward and NDF Rates Methodology Guide,
REFINITIV
BENCHMARK
SERVS.
5
(Sept.
2020),
https://www.refinitiv.com/content/dam/marketing/en_us/documents/methodology/wm-reutersmethodology.pdf.
86. Thomson
Reuters
WM/Reuters
FX
Benchmark,
REFINITIV
1,
https://www.refinitiv.com/content/dam/marketing/en_us/documents/fact-sheets/wm-reuters-fxbenchmarks-fact-sheet.pdf.
87. See, e.g., Martin D.D. Evans, Peter O’Neill, Dagfinn Rime & Jo Saakvitne, Fixing the Fix?
Assessing the Eﬀectiveness of the 4pm Fix Benchmark 1 (Oct. 22, 2018) (unpublished
manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3270844. For most of the relevant period, these rates were
calculated by taking the median of the spot currency trades in the interbank market during the oneminute window beginning thirty seconds prior to 4 p.m. and ending thirty seconds after 4 p.m. Id.
at 4.
88. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
89. See Evans, O’Neill, Rime & Saakvitne, supra note 87, at 2 (identifying $6 trillion in funds
that reference indices with the WM/Reuters FX rates as inputs); Verstein, Benchmark Manipulation,
supra note 12, at 235–36 (describing the vast reach of the WM/Reuters FX rates, including by being
referenced by equities indices and investment funds).
90. See Rime & Schrimpf, supra note 7, at 27; Triennial Central Bank Survey: Foreign
Exchange Turnover in April 2013: Preliminary Global Results, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS 9
(Sept. 2013), http://www.bis.org/publ/rpfx13fx.pdf.
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a vanilla (fixed-for-floating) interest rate swap.91 In 2014, ISDA estimated
that the swaptions (options to enter into swaps) market itself comprised $30
trillion in outstanding contracts.92 Almost all swaptions reference ISDAFIX
in determining an exercise price (for a cash settled swaption).93
B. Benchmark Discipline
Benchmarks have facilitated tectonic informational shifts in OTC
markets. By very inexpensively coordinating the price discovery-like
functions of dealers, benchmarks have had enormous benefits for the market,
including enhancing price transparency, lowering the cost of contracting,
expanding the range of hedging opportunities, and generating huge amounts
of liquidity through network effects. This Part considers each in turn.
1. Price and Execution Transparency
Benchmarks have essentially allowed ordinary market participants to
leverage information capabilities of large dealers. This has led to radically
reduced information asymmetries and greater price accuracy.
Consider two parties. Party A holds an asset that pays a fixed rate of
2.5% a month. Party B has an investment that pays a variable interest rate
each month. If the two parties are dissatisfied with their payment streams,
for example if Party B prefers the certainty of a fixed payment or Party A
believes the market will outperform the rate it is entitled to, they can enter
into an interest rate swap, whereby Party A pays its 2.5% to Party B and
receives the variable rate from Party B. The value of the variable rate will
determine gains and losses to both parties (usually netted out).
The value of the variable rate can vary enormously. Overwhelmingly,
it is tied to LIBOR.94 But consider a world without LIBOR, or without some
market benchmark for interest rates. It does not seem an exaggeration to say
that an end user would have negligible ability to determine such rates.
Contracts would likely vary wildly in borrowing rates. But LIBOR
introduces significant uniformity and predictability, not only for any given
end user or borrower, but also across end users and borrowers.
As another example, consider the world before foreign exchange
benchmarks were introduced. A company seeking to purchase foreign
91. ICE Swap Rate, INTERCONTINENTAL EXCH., https://www.theice.com/iba/ice-swap-rate
(last visited Aug. 6, 2020).
92. The Value of Derivatives, supra note 33.
93. ICE Swap Rate, supra note 91.
94. See Levine, Banks Will Miss LIBOR, supra note 10; Karen Fernandez, The LIBOR Is a
Global Interest Rate That Affects the Rates of Many Loans and Investments. Here’s How It’s Set,
and Why It’s Slated to End, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 29, 2020), https://www.businessinsider.com/whatis-libor.
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currency would need to engage in a bilateral, iterative search for price quotes
from dealers, and have little ability to monitor the actual execution of the
transaction ex post. With the introduction of WM/Reuters FX rates, that
same firm need only request that its purchase be executed using the public 4
p.m. WM/Reuters FX rates.95
The reduced ambiguity and increased uniformity in transacting resulting
from the introduction of benchmarks lowers the cost of entering into OTC
transactions in the first place. Rather than engage in a one-off transaction
with a dealer who possesses superior information about the value of an
asset—whether the correct pricing of a loan, the settlement value of a bespoke
interest rate contract, or the exchange rate of any given currency—market
participants can simply look to the aggregated agreed-upon price set by
multiple dealers and capitalize on their knowledge.96
Benchmarks also mitigate search frictions. For end users and other
traders, this can encourage efficient entry, enabling them to more easily
identify “low-cost” dealers and decide whether to participate at all in the
market.97 As pointed out in the examples above, a pension fund that needs
to value foreign-denominated assets could simply request that its assets be
benchmarked against the WM/Reuters fix, so that the fund does not need to
engage in costly search. Similarly, LIBOR enables end users to ascertain the
suitability of a loan rate with less difficulty.98 This most benefits the least
sophisticated customers, who might otherwise find the cost of participating
in OTC markets too high. Indeed, in FX markets, evidence demonstrates that
the least sophisticated clients most frequently request trade execution at
benchmark prices.99 These benefits are compounded because end users have
much lower costs of ex-post monitoring of execution when they can employ
benchmarks. Reference prices will be public, reducing the risk of being
fleeced by those with superior information.100 In this way, benchmarks may
also incentivize better behavior by agents.
95. See supra text accompanying note 87.
96. Thus Duffie, Dworczak, and Zhu identify three main benefits of benchmarks in markets
with persistent information asymmetries: contracts with formulas that settle by reference to a
benchmark, enabling ex-post monitoring of execution quality, and the ability to compare quotes
received to a benchmark. Duffie, Dworczak & Zhu, supra note 11, at 5 (observing that in certain
markets “[b]enchmarks would be almost redundant, from the viewpoint of pre-trade price
transparency, if the best executable price quotes are published and accessible to all market
participants, for example on an open central limit order book”).
97. Id. at 2 (noting that increased transparency can result in lowered quotes due to competition,
which can, in turn, reduce wasteful search and promote business for low-cost or more efficient
dealers since cost is more observable).
98. See Duffie & Stein, supra note 11, at 194.
99. Id. at 194–95.
100. Id. (noting that agent behavior will be easier to observe when benchmarks exist as a basis
for comparison).
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2. Contracting
Price terms are often the most difficult to negotiate aspects of a longterm contract, because of risks of opportunism and breach.101 But by
incorporating a benchmark into a legally binding contract, parties can retain
future flexibility without ceding certainty or clarity.102 For example,
derivative contracts almost universally tie their payment conditions to
benchmark values at multiple points into the future.103 By incorporating
benchmarks as price terms either directly or by reference, for example
agreeing to a loan that uses LIBOR as a term, or entering into a long term set
of swaptions with settlement terms that periodically are determined by
ISDAFIX, parties reduce the need to negotiate a complete price schedule ex
ante. The tricky (and sometimes impossible) endeavor of attempting to
predict price fluctuations into the future becomes largely unnecessary thanks
to financial benchmarks.
Through benchmarks incorporated as price referents, then, parties are
able to benefit from the expertise of dealers, or those who set the benchmarks,
which can overall increase contracting efficiency.104
3. Hedging
All of these benefits accumulate to allow parties participating in OTC
markets to better hedge and allocate risk. A greater number of parties have
access to an expanded range of instruments, more accurate prices, and
increased liquidity.105 This Article began with the Delta example. Consider
a cross-currency swap, a transaction that can enable parties to achieve
cheaper funds to support growth abroad. If a U.S. company, Apple, wishes
to expand operations in Japan and seeks Japanese yen, and a Japanese
company, Sony, needs U.S. dollars to do the same in the U.S., the two
companies can (through dealers) enter into a cross-currency swap. This
would be beneficial since, presumably, it is cheaper for Apple to borrow in
U.S. dollars than in Japanese yen, and vice versa for Sony. A cross-currency
swap can provide a useful means to accomplish this: both Apple and Sony
101. See, e.g., Andrew Verstein, Ex Tempore Contracting, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1869,
1877–78 (2014) [hereinafter Verstein, Ex Tempore Contracting].
102. See Verstein, Benchmark Manipulation, supra note 12, at 226. There is a rich literature on
the benefits of “flexible and unambiguous” contracts. See, e.g., id.; George G. Triantis, The
Efficiency of Vague Contract Terms: A Response to the Schwartz-Scott Theory of U.C.C. Article 2,
62 LA. L. REV. 1065, 1068 (2002); Verstein, Ex Tempore Contracting, supra note 101.
103. Hardwired into contracts in this way, benchmarks effectively act as the price. See Verstein,
Benchmark Manipulation, supra note 12, at 226–28 (also noting the commonplace nature of tying
payment conditions to benchmarks rather than the price of, say, a commodity).
104. See Rauterberg & Verstein, Index Theory, supra note 9, at 11 (referencing Eastern Air Lines
v. Gulf Oil for referring to the Platts oil price index as the arbiter of oil prices, rather than courts).
105. Id. at 11 (these benefits accrue to retail investors as well as institutional ones).
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borrow in their respective domestic debt markets and swap the amounts.
Interest rates paid by Apple and Sony on the loans are usually tied to LIBOR.
Because LIBOR is designed to measure banks’ borrowing costs, lending to
Apple or Sony at a rate tied to LIBOR means that banks can match their
borrowing cost with their lending revenue. If a bank’s cost of borrowing
rises, then so does its lending revenue, and vice versa.106 In this way, LIBOR,
if properly functioning, can make it easier for banks to hedge, which in turn
should lower the cost of providing such a loan to Apple or Sony, which in
turn can promote socially beneficial global growth.
These hedging benefits are compounded due to the increasing linkages
that characterize financial markets. Using a single benchmark rate as a price
term across many disparate transactions increases market actors’ ability not
only to map risk and price across various transactions and even across various
rates, but to better understand risk across multiple LIBOR exposures.107 If
done properly, this reduces risk while facilitating greater or differentiated
exposures.
4. Network Effects
In addition to first order information benefits, benchmarks have also
generated enormous network effects, which greatly increase liquidity marketwide.
Widespread use generates additional liquidity, and increased liquidity
attracts additional use.108 This sort of network effect, in contrast with the
supply-side oligopolistic characteristics described above, is a demand-side
phenomenon: the demand for a service or product is shaped by existing
demand.109 In particular, network effects exist when the value to a user of an
additional unit increases by simple virtue of additional users or units.110 One
obvious example is a telephone, which would be useless if used only by one
person, but which becomes more and more useful the larger the network of
106. This can be beneficial to banks in another way. See Duffie & Stein, supra note 11, at 195
(describing how adverse selection may impede a bank’s ability to hedge volatility in its own
borrowing costs, because the bank has private information about its own credit risk, and
counterparties might be justly wary of taking an opposite position).
107. See Rauterberg & Verstein, Transnational Regulation, supra note 4, at 25.
108. See THIERRY FOUCAULT, MARCO PAGANO, AND AILSA RÖELL, MARKET LIQUIDITY:
THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND POLICY 310 (2013); Awrey, Derivatives Market Efficiency, supra note 5,
at 1135–36 (explicating the mechanism by which liquidity generates liquidity: depth and volume
promote price discovery, narrowing spreads and attracting more traders, which creates more depth,
and so on); Awrey, Private Ordering, supra note 75, at 194–95 (examining the pull of network
effects on markets).
109. See STAN J. LIEBOWITZ & STEPHEN E. MARGOLIS, WINNERS, LOSERS & MICROSOFT:
COMPETITION AND ANTITRUST IN HIGH TECHNOLOGY 67 (2001).
110. See Nicholas Economides, Competition Policy in Network Industries: An Introduction 5
(NYU Ctr. for Law and Bus. Research Paper No. 03-10, 2004), https://ssrn.com/abstract=386626.
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people using it.111 Financial exchanges (such as the NYSE and NASDAQ)
are another example. Increased activity on the exchange increases the utility
of any trader’s participation in the exchange.112 Benchmarks provide a
similar benefit, as the more entities that measure interest rate risk using
LIBOR, the more valuable LIBOR is in standardizing transactions and
providing price information across otherwise disparate contracts. In the same
way that commonly used contract terms yield greater value by receiving
increased clarity via judicial precedents, shared business practices, and utility
of associated documentation, widespread adoption of a benchmark can bring
significant benefits in the form of interoperability and transparency across
otherwise disparate contracts and documents.113 Public bodies also cite to
benchmarks (including directly in statutes and regulations), affording a
presumption of validity to benchmark-linked prices and contractual terms.114
These benefits are compounded for instruments of longer duration, for
example, an interest rate swap that extends for several years into the future.115
Financial benchmarks have vastly increased the notional value in OTC
markets and reduced information asymmetries and search frictions, enabling
more participants than ever to access the risk-shifting benefits bestowed by
such markets. That benchmarks would have such transformative effects
makes sense,116 because network effects tend to be most powerful under
circumstances with the greatest uncertainties.117
But network effects also exert a pull in the other direction. A widely
relied upon benchmark with powerful network effects might cause more
standardization across transactions than is socially beneficial or which might
exist in an alternate equilibrium. Marcel Kahan and Michael Klausner have
identified this tendency in the corporate contracting context, arguing that
network effects will cause contracts to be more standardized than in their

111. Id. at 9.
112. See, e.g., Carmine Di Noia, The Stock-Exchange Industry: Network Effects, Implicit
Mergers, and Corporate Governance 9-10 (MARZO Working Paper No. 33, 1999),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=200991 (noting that the more liquid an exchange is, the more
intermediaries and participants wish to trade on it, as the greater number of users raises the utility
for all); Economides, supra note 110, at 5.
113. See Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA.
L. REV. 757, 761 (1995); Rauterberg & Verstein, Index Theory, supra note 9, at 14.
114. See Verstein, Benchmark Manipulation, supra note 12, at 227 (noting the presumption of
validity often afforded to benchmarks cited by statutes, investment funds, retirement plans, etc.).
115. See Klausner, supra note 113, at 828 (describing this phenomenon in contractual choices).
116. See generally Frank Partnoy, Second-Order Benefits from Standards, 48 B.C.L. REV. 169
(2007) (observing that some of the most important benefits from such coordination achievements
are those having to do with standard setting and network effects).
117. See Klausner, supra note 113, at 784 (describing that network effects tend to be largest for
the most ambiguous or complex terms, as well as the most commonplace practices).
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absence.118 Bob Scott has also pointed out that in multilateral markets,
economies of scale that promote standardization may also paradoxically
amplify the stickiness of inefficient contract terms.119 These effects are
considered more closely in Part III.C.
There are a few additional consequences that flow out of network
effects. As observed by Nicholas Economides and others, markets with
network effects will tend to experience rapid expansion, a “natural”
monopoly among suppliers may occur (which we have already seen), path
dependence will be strong, and traditional forms of competition may not
cause change to the naturally occurring market structure.120 “[L]ock-in” can
occur, as each iterative decision may “look[] optimal given past decisions,
but is sub-optimal if earlier investment decisions had been delayed and all
the decisions were taken at once.”121 These will be considered next.
III. BENCHMARK DISTORTIONS
The efficiencies achieved through dealer-mediated private ordering in
OTC benchmark markets should not be overlooked. But they are additionally
notable because they have resulted from the serendipitous alignment of
dealers’ incentives with end users’ incentives. Financial benchmarks largely
originated with dealers “without regulatory pressure”; even though
benchmarks may reduce dealers’ informational advantages, increased
liquidity and volume resulting from a benchmark can more than offset lost
profits.122
So long as dealers’ incentives are aligned with other market
participants’ incentives more broadly, socially beneficial innovation—such
as the promulgation of financial benchmarks—will tend to occur.123 But
118. See Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate
Contracting (or “the Economics of Boilerplate”), 83 VA. L. REV. 713, 729 (1997).
119. See Robert Scott, The Paradox of Contracting in Markets L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
(forthcoming), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3561705.
120. See Economides, supra note 110, at 10–17.
121. Id. at 23 (observing that rapid technological change can exacerbate this problem with an
oligopoly, where firms race to adopt the current best technology, failing to account for the next
update).
122. Duffie, Dworczak & Zhu, supra note 11, at 3, 17 (explaining that dealers may be
incentivized to introduce a benchmark to obtain increased volume that offsets losses due to reduced
information advantages); Duffie & Stein, supra note 11, at 194.
123. This relates to a literature on “soft” governance or private regulation, which need not
originate with legislative bodies or public rule-making institutions. Most regulation in OTC markets
has originated through such governance. A particularly successful example is the growth of the
International Swaps and Derivatives Association (“ISDA”) as a “private” regulator in derivatives
markets. See, e.g., Saule T. Omarova, Wall Street as Community of Fate: Toward Financial
Industry Self-Regulation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 411, 444 (2011); Rauterberg & Verstein,
Transnational Regulation, supra note 4, at 20–24 (collecting sources). Self-regulation has been an
important feature of financial governance since the inception of markets, and a rich debate continues
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while the standardizing effects of such “default” benchmarks can be
revolutionary, they can also entrench suboptimal structures, such as faulty
benchmarks.
This Part identifies distortions that have arisen in these markets,
showing that the persistence of certain benchmarks should not be taken to
necessarily indicate their desirability. In particular, the structures explicated
thus far—lack of coordination mechanisms, oligopolistic domination by a
few dealers, fantastically successful standardization of prices and referents
through benchmarks, and deep network effects—can promote inefficient
pooling around the “default” benchmark, even if it is suboptimal. This Part
discusses three main categories of distortions: (a) entrenched oligopolistic
structures, (b) the temptation of manipulation and weakened incentives to
monitor wrongdoing, and (c) stagnation around a suboptimal benchmark.
A. Entrenchment of Oligopolistic Structures
The first distortion—entrenched oligopolistic structures—arises
because there is an outsize stickiness to the structures that have evolved—
due to network effects and complexity of markets.124 This is related to the
literature on the first mover advantage, which can be greatly amplified when
learning or network externalities are present.125 Indeed, economists have
shown that in cases where substantial network effects exist, there tends to be
dominance by one or a few suppliers of a good, creating great inequality
between would-be competitors.126
Here, the fact that OTC markets are dealer markets and the complexity
of transactions in OTC markets fuel dealer concentration, which is amplified
as to benefits and harms: the increased ability to leverage an industry’s expertise and added
flexibility to respond to problems without the blunt force of government regulation must be balanced
against potential conflicts of interest. This very tension has spurred much of the hybrid selfregulation that occurs in modern financial markets, whereby entities such as FINRA self-regulate
(in the case of broker-dealers) with supplemental government oversight imposed by the SEC.
124. Others have observed this in broader contexts. See generally Awrey, Private Ordering,
supra note 75 (identifying distortions due to network externalities, path dependency, and power
inequality in markets as a whole, and especially ones that are opaque, and noting that the success of
certain market structures might paradoxically deter welfare-enhancing innovation).
125. See, e.g., Ian Domowitz, Electronic Derivatives Exchanges: Implicit Mergers, Network
Externalities, and Standardization, 35 Q. REV. ECON. & FIN. 163, 167 (1995) (in the case of floor
trading vs. electronic trading, noting that dominant liquidity effects and a first-mover advantage
resulted in lock in to floor trading simply because it was cheaper and came first, a result that was
not simply due to irrationality but due to network effects and first mover advantage); Michael L.
Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network Effects, 8 J. ECON. PERSPS. 93, 107 (1994).
126. See Economides, supra note 110, at 12 (explaining that the universe of products offered by
firms with large market shares is more valuable to consumers when network effects are present,
creating a feedback loop that attracts even more customers (pointing to PC systems markets as an
example), and noting that this inequality does not arise due to anticompetitive actions by any one
firm).
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by dealers’ outsize influence over the price discovery functions played by
benchmarks. Benchmarks effectively designate the most influential dealers
by selecting them to participate in the benchmark setting process. One
scholar has even argued “that the most efficient dealers can use a benchmark
as a ‘price transparency weapon’ that drives inefficient competitors out of the
market and draws trades to dealers in the ‘benchmark club.’”127 It makes
sense for end users to seek out those dealers as counterparties, deeming them
most informed, which creates a feedback loop that solidifies those dealers’
positional advantages not only vis-à-vis their clients, but vis-à-vis their less
powerful competitors as well.128 Benchmarks can thus create a kind of
bottleneck for competition.
Relatedly, dealers may develop additional outsize influence over
regulation.
Without alternatives, a single benchmark can become
“systemically” important in the same way that a bank or financial institution
can, reducing the credibility of regulatory or market discipline.129 In 2018, a
Federal Reserve Bank committee report acknowledged as much with respect
to LIBOR:
Because U.S. dollar (USD) LIBOR is used in such a large volume
and broad range of financial products and contracts, the risks
surrounding it pose a potential threat to the safety and soundness
of individual financial institutions and to financial stability.
Without advanced preparation, a sudden cessation of such a
heavily used reference rate would cause considerable disruptions
to and uncertainties around the large gross flows of USD LIBORrelated payments and receipts between many firms. It would also
impair the normal functioning of a variety of markets, including
business and consumer lending.130
This risk is not merely hypothetical. Because LIBOR determines
worldwide loan and mortgage rates, systematic underreporting of LIBOR in
2008 resulted in artificially low payments to those banks from borrowers,
meaning they were undercompensated for their risks, which potentially
exacerbated the crisis.131

127. Duffie, Dworczak & Zhu, supra note 11, at 3.
128. See id. at 4; Glode & Opp, supra note 4, at 1.
129. There is a vast literature on the consequences of systemically important financial
institutions (“SIFIs”). See, e.g., FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY
REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL
AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES xviii–xix (2011).
130. N.Y. FED. RES., ALTERNATIVE REF. RATES COMM., SECOND REPORT OF THE
ALTERNATIVE
REFERENCE
RATES
COMMITTEE
1
(March
2018),
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/Microsites/arrc/files/2018/ARRC-Second-report.
131. See Bainbridge, supra note 14, at 797–98 (also noting that artificially low LIBOR rates
would have caused losses for investors).
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It is not difficult to imagine how, as dealers amass expertise and become
indispensable to the benchmark setting process, they can gain some control
over legal and regulatory aspects of the market as well.132 Dealers are in a
naturally superior bargaining position, not only because they are experts, but
because they are far fewer in number and do not suffer from the collective
action problems that end users do.133 For example, in 2000, the passage of
the Commodities Futures Modernization Act (“CFMA”) essentially removed
swaps and most derivatives from regulation, which some have argued
precipitated the 2008 financial crisis.134 Powerful lobbying by the derivatives
industry, the argument goes, stymied regulatory efforts to exercise
jurisdiction over derivatives.135 Just as worryingly, these dealers are usually
systemically critical institutions,136 which may skew regulators’ actions even
more severely.137 With benchmarks, the problem has only grown. Evidence
has emerged that as early as the middle of 2008, regulators were informed of
potential wrongdoing around LIBOR but took no action. Instead, regulators
at the Bank of England seem to have implicitly endorsed manipulation out of
fears that doing otherwise would have further undermined global confidence
in the banks.138 This kind of influence is only amplified as regulators and
public bodies increasingly rely on any given benchmark and that benchmark
becomes “systemically” important in the same way that a bank or financial
institution can be.
B. Benchmark Manipulation
Manipulation is one of the most obvious distortive consequences of the
structures laid out above.139 In financial markets, manipulation is particularly
attractive when a small tweak will have a disproportionately large financial
132. As early as 1993, scholars were identifying the growing knowledge gap between regulators
and industry participants. See, e.g., Hu, supra note 32, at 1463.
133. See Judge, Intermediary Influence, supra note 59, at 597–98.
134. See, e.g., Stout, supra note 27, at 22–29. The argument then goes that rampant speculative
trading in derivatives outpaced legitimate hedging activity.
135. See Rauterberg & Verstein, Transnational Regulation, supra note 4 (arguing that ISDA’s
expertise in standardizing swap practices led to their successful lobby to end the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission’s (“CFTC”) direct supervision of OTC derivatives through enactment of the
CFMA).
136. These are usually SIFIs. See 2018 List of Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs),
FIN. STABILITY BD. (Nov. 16, 2018), https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/P161118-1.pdf.
137. See Rauterberg & Verstein, Index Theory, supra note 9, at 48 (noting that punishment may
not be credible against indices that are socially important).
138. See Rauterberg & Verstein, Transnational Regulation, supra note 4, at 38–39 (detailing
documents that demonstrate potential knowledge of Bank of England and Federal Reserve Bank of
New York officials); How Britain’s Rate-Fixing Scandal Might Spread — And What to Do About
It, ECONOMIST (July 7, 2012), http://www.economist.com/node/21558260.
139. Manipulation is an age-old phenomenon. See generally JERRY W. MARKHAM, LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND THE HISTORY OF FINANCIAL MARKET MANIPULATION 14–16 (2014).
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effect.140 Benchmarks have essentially hardwired just such a structural
asymmetry into OTC markets.
The same mechanisms through which benchmarks provided
ingenious—and inexpensive—ways to overcome otherwise costly
information asymmetries also provided inexpensive means of manipulation.
First, because benchmarks are so deeply integrated into markets where
trading notionals have grown to sizes in the trillions, a would-be manipulator
of foreign currency rates, for example, would not need to control the global
supply of Japanese yen; they would need only tweak the benchmark rate to
which the worldwide exchange rates are indexed.141 A single benchmark,
referenced throughout enormous markets, thus presents a particularly
tempting target for manipulation.142
Second, benchmarks’ setting
methodologies render them susceptible to influence. Methodologies usually
rely on a concentrated sliver of data from a narrow subset of market
participants, aggregating massive amounts of financial data in one
predictable, repeated calculation.143 The same dealers who are counterparties
to most transactions that reference benchmark rates are also those either
tasked with setting those benchmark rates or whose trades will naturally have
greater impact on them, creating opportunities to manipulate and incentives
to do so.144
140. See generally Anthony Lee Zhang, Competition and Manipulation in Derivative Contract
Markets (July 28, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3413265 (developing
a model that predicts susceptibility to manipulation). More traditional market manipulation is
otherwise extremely costly. Traditionally, manipulation required obtaining enormous amounts of
any given asset and control over a market segment. This is not only resource-intensive, but it is
risky. The market could easily move against a manipulator before they have time to unwind their
position, undoing any potential profits. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 9, at 1940–41; Verstein,
Benchmark Manipulation, supra note 12, at 220–24 (discussing the difficulties of traditional market
manipulation and its attendant transaction costs, liquidity issues, carrying costs, and general risks
of idiosyncratic risk or illiquid markets that will reduce a manipulator’s ability to profit). In the
past, some academics have even dismissed the necessity of regulating manipulation and deemed it
self-deterring due to the cost associated with successful manipulation. See Daniel R. Fischel &
David J. Ross, Should the Law Prohibit “Manipulation” in Financial Markets?, 105 HARV. L. REV.
503, 512–13 (1991) (arguing, famously, that market manipulation is self-deterring for cost and
incentive reasons); cf. Steve Thel, $850,000 in Six Minutes—The Mechanics of Securities
Manipulation, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 219, 261 (1994).
141. See Fletcher, supra note 9, at 1960 (discussing how benchmark manipulation is manifestly
not self-deterring for concerns of detection or costliness of upfront investment); Verstein,
Benchmark Manipulation, supra note 12 at 217.
142. See LOUIS KAPLOW, COMPETITION POLICY AND PRICE FIXING 282 (2013) (noting an oftcited benchmark is a tempting manipulation target in the antitrust context).
143. See Verstein, Benchmark Manipulation, supra note 12, at 225 (describing how benchmark
providers produce a single benchmark rate, and explaining that “benchmarks represent market
prices but they are not identical with them”).
144. See, e.g., David Hou & David Skeie, LIBOR: Origins, Economics, Crisis, Scandal, and
Reform, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y. STAFF REPORT NO. 667, 8 (Mar.
2014), https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff_reports/sr667.pdf.
In
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And we have seen various incarnations of manipulation play out with
respect to benchmarks—both collusive and unilateral. With respect to
LIBOR, banks’ derivatives traders benefited if they could convince the
LIBOR submitter to over- or underestimate the bank’s cost of borrowing on
any given day in order to benefit those traders’ positions.145 This was
successful due to the disparity between the sampling market and the vast
derivatives market tied to LIBOR. Hefty positions for which payments
depended on LIBOR made minuscule distortions extremely profitable.146 For
example, Connan Snider and Thomas Youle calculated that in a single
quarter, a 25 basis point (0.25%) change in LIBOR could net $337 million in
interest revenue for JPMorgan, and $936 million for Citigroup, based on their
outstanding exposures.147 These were clearly not net zero positions.148 In
single loan terms, one loan for $10 million by Bank of America paying
LIBOR + 1% would net an additional $25,000 to Bank of America for a mere
0.25% rise in LIBOR.
Manipulation of ISDAFIX operated similarly. If reference banks had
swaptions expiring on some day, they could push the ISDAFIX on that day
setting LIBOR, a panel of reference banks were asked, “At what rate could you borrow funds . . . in
a reasonable market size just prior to 11 am?” and, after discarding the highest and lowest answers,
the
average
of
the
remainders
was
taken.
The
Basics,
BBALIBOR,
https://web.archive.org/web/20120121102345/http://www.bbalibor.com/bbalibor-explained/thebasics (last visited Feb. 2, 2020) (emphasis omitted). The setting of ISDAFIX was calculated based
on a combination of trading in the interdealer swaps market followed by submissions from eleven
dealer banks. See, e.g., Order Instituting Proceedings Pursuant to Sections 6(c) and 6(d) of the
Commodity Exchange Act, Making Findings, and Imposing Remedial Sanctions at 6, 12, In re
Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., No. 17-03 (Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n Dec. 21, 2016),
https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legal
pleading/enfgoldmansachsorder122116.pdf. And the WM/Reuters FX rates were calculated by
taking the median of the spot currency transactions, and only in the interdealer market, during the
one-minute window from thirty seconds prior to 4 p.m. to thirty seconds after 4 p.m. See FOREIGN
EXCH. BENCHMARK GRP., FIN. STABILITY BD., FOREIGN EXCHANGE BENCHMARKS
CONSULTATIVE
DOCUMENT
7
(2014),
https://www.fsb.org/wpcontent/uploads/r_140715.pdf?page_moved=1. While the susceptibility to manipulation of LIBOR
and ISDAFIX may be obvious, it is important to point out that the transaction-based methodology
of the WM/Reuters FX rates does not protect them from influence. “The ability to strategically feed
or starve the transactional benchmark of transactional data gives transactors outsized influence.”
Verstein, Benchmark Manipulation, supra note 12, at 241; see also Duffie & Stein, supra note 11,
at 194 (noting that when a counterparty is also a benchmark setter it greatly amplifies the
manipulation incentive).
145. See, e.g., Press Release No. 15-499, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 18; Press Release No.
13-161, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 18.
146. Duffie & Stein, supra note 11, at 200 (observing the minuscule rate distortions in LIBOR
manipulation cases); Rauterberg & Verstein, Index Theory, supra note 9, at 4 (citing a study
demonstrating that a sustained 1.75% raise in the six-month LIBOR (as was the case in 2008) would
mean additional thousands of dollars paid in interest on home mortgages a year per borrower, which
would increase mortgage defaults when systemic risk was already a huge concern).
147. Snider & Youle, supra note 19, at 10.
148. See, e.g., Rauterberg & Verstein, Index Theory, supra note 9, at 32.
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by trading the underlying swaps in a certain direction or submitting a higher
or lower ISDAFIX. That would then determine the value of the swaptions
and enable the bank to profit illicitly.149
In FX, the manipulation took place both unilaterally and via shared
information—dealers shared confidential client information ahead of the
benchmark setting time so that manipulators could trade to profit at the
expense of their clients.150 For example, if a dealer received an order from a
client who wished to purchase a huge number of Japanese yen at the
WM/Reuters 4 p.m. fix price (that is, the dealer would be selling yen to the
client at 4 p.m.),151 entering into those trades would likely have some effect
on the exchange rate. However, if that dealer shared this intended trade with
the other big players in advance of the trade so as to coordinate activity, then
that dealer might be able to buy the necessary yen in ways so as to push the
4 p.m. WM/Reuters rate up, and end up selling that yen to its customer at an
artificially high rate. Dealers also engaged in front running (trading for their
own accounts ahead of filling customers’ orders), which was so ubiquitous
that some commentators have likened it to a mere cost of doing business.152
The widespread hardwiring of benchmarks also dilutes the threat of
enforcement. It is almost impossible to measure damages or profits as a result
of such schemes,153 and it may simply be unrealistic to disgorge illicit profits
149. See, e.g., Press Release No. 7180-15, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, CFTC
Orders Barclays to Pay $115 Million Penalty for Attempted Manipulation of and False Reporting
of
U.S.
Dollar
ISDAFIX
Benchmark
Swap
Rates
(May
20,
2015),
https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/7180-15; Press Release No. 7371-16, U.S.
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, CFTC Orders Citibank to Pay $250 Million for Attempted
Manipulation and False Reporting of U.S. Dollar ISDAFIX Benchmark Swap Rates (May 25,
2016), https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/7371-16; Press Release No. 7505-16, U.S.
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, CFTC Orders Goldman Sachs to Pay $120 Million Penalty
for Attempted Manipulation of and False Reporting of U.S. Dollar ISDAFIX Benchmark Swap
Rates (Dec. 21, 2016), https://cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/7505-16.
150. See Press Release No. 7065-14, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, CFTC Orders
Five Banks to Pay over $1.4 Billion in Penalties for Attempted Manipulation of Foreign Exchange
Benchmark Rates (Nov. 12, 2014), https://cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/7056-14; Press
Release No. 15-643, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Five Major Banks Agree to Parent-Level Guilty Pleas
(May 20, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/five-major-banks-agree-parent-level-guiltypleas#:~:text=Five%20major%20banks%20%E2%80%93%20Citicorp%2C%20JPMorgan,plead
%20guilty%20to%20felony%20charges.
151. In the FX market, if a customer places an order with, say, Citibank at 3:30 p.m. to purchase
two billion yen at the 4 p.m. fix, Citi will purchase the two billion and then sell them to the
counterparty at the 4 p.m. fixing price. See, e.g., Matt Levine, Banks Manipulated Foreign
Exchange
in
Ways
You
Can’t
Teach,
BLOOMBERG
(Nov.
12,
2014),
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2014-11-12/banks-manipulated-foreign-exchangein-ways-you-can-t-teach [hereinafter Levine, Banks Manipulated Foreign Exchange].
152. See Duffie & Stein, supra note 11, at 195 n.2.
153. This is especially true given that in cases such as LIBOR, damages models will need to
ascertain the counterfactual or “true” cost of borrowing that ought to have been reported instead.
Moreover, in all these cases, determining how and when gains might have offset losses will be
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(the “too big to litigate” problem).154 Any downside to manipulation may
also be deemed remote because of confused applicability of legal regimes.155
Thus far, regulators and civil plaintiffs involved in benchmark-related actions
have relied on, varyingly, the Sherman Antitrust Act,156 the Commodity
Exchange Act,157 state antitrust laws, tort, contract, fraud, unfair business
practice laws,158 federal and state securities laws,159 and even the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”).160 Applicability of any or all
such regimes has been far from obvious. Federal district courts have
disagreed widely on whether the benchmark setting process was a
competitive one, whether a benchmark constitutes a “price,” and whether
“antitrust injury” under the antitrust laws can result.161 These uncertainties
do little to foster optimal deterrence levels and instead can result in both overand under-deterrence.162 The applicability of such legal regimes is discussed
further in Part IV.A.

additionally difficult. See, e.g., James Kavanagh & Reinder Van Dijk, LIBOR Damages: Key
Emerging Issues, INT’L COMPARATIVE LEGAL GUIDES (Oct. 17, 2012), http://www.cdrnews.com/categories/expert-views/libor-damages:-key-emerging-issues.
154. Rauterberg & Verstein, Transnational Regulation, supra note 4, at 40–41. This is
exacerbated by the fact that benchmark setters are usually SIFIs. Id.
155. For example, a traditional understanding of antitrust activity focuses on output: restricting
output or flooding the market with output, to affect supply, demand, and prices in relatively clear
ways. See, e.g., Price Fixing, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competitionguidance/guide-antitrust-laws/dealings-competitors/price-fixing (last visited Feb. 2, 2020). But
measuring alleged antitrust activity around LIBOR or FX by looking at “output” is difficult: what
is the “output,” what is supplied, what is demanded, what is the price?
156. See Gelboim v. Bank of Am. Corp., 823 F.3d 759, 770–71 (2d Cir. 2016); Alaska Elec.
Pension Fund v. Bank of Am. Corp., 175 F. Supp. 3d 44, 53–54 (S.D.N.Y. 2016); In re Foreign
Exch. Benchmark Rates Antitrust Litig., 74 F. Supp. 3d 581, 590–91 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); Press Release
No. 15-643, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 150.
157. See Press Release No. 7794-18, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, CFTC Orders
Bank of America, N.A. to Pay $30 Million Penalty for Attempted Manipulation and False Reporting
of
U.S.
Dollar
ISDAFIX
Benchmark
Swap
Rates
(Sept.
19,
2018),
https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases?7794-18.
158. See Alaska Elec. Pension Fund, 175 F. Supp. 3d at 49; In re Foreign Exch. Benchmark, 74
F. Supp. 3d at 585–86; In re Libor-Based Fin. Instruments Antitrust Litig., 935 F. Supp. 2d 666,
677 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
159. See In re LIBOR-Based Fin. Instruments, 935 F. Supp. 2d at 677 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
160. See Allen v. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC, 895 F.3d 214, 217 (2d Cir. 2018).
161. See Gelboim v. Bank of Am. Corp., 823 F.3d 759, 771–77 (2d Cir. 2016) (“In urging
otherwise, the Banks argue that LIBOR is not itself a price, as it is not itself bought or sold by
anyone. The point is immaterial. LIBOR forms a component of the return from various LIBORdenominated financial instruments, and the fixing of a component of price violates the antitrust
laws.”).
162. For example, some banks have attempted to withdraw from LIBOR setting. David Enrich,
Banks Warned Not to Leave LIBOR: U.K. Regulator Seeks to Protect Benchmark Rate as Lenders
Threaten to Quit Panel After Scandal, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 13 2013),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324432004578302164058534372.
Optimal
deterrence more broadly depends on forcing wrongdoers to internalize the costs of their misconduct.
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Finally, the lack of sufficient incentives for benchmark providers to
properly monitor the benchmark setting process exacerbates these
weaknesses. As Gabriel Rauterberg and Andrew Verstein have pointed out,
benchmarks are byproducts of their providers’ businesses, which may result
in both underproduction and malproduction of those benchmarks if their
providers cannot fully capture gains from their promulgation.163 Markets that
are already difficult to monitor due to their opacity—and because the actual
misconduct is difficult to detect, as a small tweak to a benchmark value that
causes outsize harm might otherwise fall within some band of ordinary
fluctuation164—then also lack monitors that are adequately incentivized,
overall decreasing the perceived threat of enforcement and lowering its
effectiveness as a deterrence mechanism.
C. Suboptimal Stagnation
The two distortive effects discussed thus far—entrenchment of
oligopolistic structures and incentives to manipulate—relate to a third effect,
and one that has received very little scholarly or regulatory attention.165 A
benchmark can itself be inefficient, yet markets might substitute towards it
anyway simply due to its widespread use. Dealer-promulgated benchmarks
that benefit from network effects and path dependencies can promote
inefficient pooling around the “default” benchmark, even if it is suboptimal.
And this is precisely more likely to occur when the markets throughout which
benchmarks are so deeply integrated depend so heavily on harmonization—
when network effects are strong.166 Thus, the persistence of certain
benchmarks should not be taken necessarily to indicate their desirability. It
may be tempting to look at OTC markets and conclude that the results of
private orders within them are indicative of optimal or efficient outcomes,
but doing so would be a mistake. A useful analogy here may be the
Uncertainty in measuring those costs due to imprecision in the law and accompanying enforcement
do little to optimize ex ante assessments of the cost of wrongdoing.
163. See Rauterberg & Verstein, Index Theory, supra note 9, at 25–26, 36–42.
164. See id. at 45 (observing the difficulty in both detection and proof: the huge scale of the
markets means that a minuscule deviation—one that might seem within the normal band of price
fluctuation—in the benchmark value could result in enormous profits).
165. There has been some attention paid to this phenomenon in the corporate context. See
Klausner, supra note 113, at 789 (observing that network externalities may render the equilibrium
competitively reached suboptimal, and classifying the result into four types: an equilibrium with
many products where one would be optimal, an equilibrium with one or too few products, an
equilibrium adopting the wrong product, or an equilibrium that “lock[s] out” beneficial innovation).
166. See Rauterberg & Verstein, Transnational Regulation, supra note 4, at 26 n.101 (noting
that network power might be particularly concerning where markets place great value on
harmonization). See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An
Analysis of the Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L. REV. 261
(1985) (providing classic explications of standardization contracts); Kahan & Klausner, supra note
118.
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persistence of the QWERTY layout for keyboards, developed in 1868, which
due to network effects and first-mover stickiness still endures today, over 150
years later.167
In benchmark markets, suboptimal stagnation can occur for reasons both
to do with users’ transaction choices and promulgators’ lack of incentives to
introduce alternative benchmarks or update benchmark methodology in
response to changing market conditions. First, the perceived price
transparency benefits of a benchmark might outweigh lack of fit with an
institution’s transactional needs, such that, for example, market participants
may choose to transact at the 4 p.m. WM/Reuters FX rates even if transacting
at some other time would be more optimal.168 This may also occur due to the
liquidity benefits offered by that benchmark, as high trading volume often
garners faster execution, lower prices, and less onerous search.169 These
liquidity benefits will draw parties away from less-actively traded
products.170 The “basin of attraction [of a benchmark] can thus become larger
and larger, given the positive feedback effects of informational transparency
and liquidity.”171
In addition, entire ecosystems of additional products can sprout up
around a particularly successful benchmark, in large part due to the network
effects previously discussed.172 As a benchmark becomes more commonly
referenced, additional products will tend to incorporate that benchmark, and
standardization throughout the product ecosystem will attract additional use
by market participants. LIBOR’s established dominance in the 1980s led to
the introduction of many LIBOR-based hedging instruments, which only
amplified the “magnetic qualities of LIBOR-based trading.”173
These effects may dominate and cause extra stickiness of a benchmark,
even if the market is aware of its potential for manipulation. The switching

167. See Di Noia, supra note 112, at 9; Rauterberg & Verstein, Index Theory, supra note 9, at
43 (observing that network effects with indices mean that a single index will likely dominate); Craig
Pirrong, Bund for Glory, or It’s a Long Way to Tip a Market 3 (Feb. 23, 2005) (unpublished
manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=672504 (with respect to liquidity
providers facing adverse selection, noting that they will tend to congregate on a single exchange in
order to minimize transaction costs, i.e., that markets are “tippy”).
168. See, e.g., Duffie & Stein, supra note 11, at 195.
169. See id.
170. See id.
171. Id. at 196; see also Ian W. Marsh, Panagiotis Panagiotou & Richard Payne, The WMR Fix
and its Impact on Currency Markets, NORGES BANK 6 (Sept. 29, 2017), https://www.norgesbank.no/contentassets/619c8b75e1ed4ba691e8ad6a006855e6/39-panagiotou—-the-wmr-fix-andits-impact-on-currency-markets-.pdf.
172. See supra Part II.B.4.
173. Duffie & Stein, supra note 11, at 196. Innovation can also be driven by supply
characteristics, rather than demand. See generally, e.g., Dan Awrey, Toward a Supply-Side Theory
of Financial Innovation, 41 J. COMPARATIVE ECON. 401 (2013).
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costs become enormous, a direct result of the very aspect that made
benchmarks so successful: their widespread adoption and use.174 Some
market participants may even choose not to switch, despite understanding the
susceptibility of benchmarks to manipulation.175 Powerful dealers can then
take advantage of a benchmark’s weaknesses without fear of market
discipline. One need only look at the status of reforms for financial
benchmarks to understand the magnitude of the problem. As the President
of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York stated in a recent speech,
“[c]ontracts that reference U.S. dollar LIBOR continue to be written, which
only serves to increase the level of systemic risk.”176 Switch has only begun
to come about because the government has mandated such, and doing so has
proven so complicated that the largest, most sophisticated dealers and their
law firms have devoted huge resources to managing the process.177
As network effects proliferate and the same benchmarks are used over
and over again, the likelihood of competition in the form of other benchmarks
or referents becomes vanishingly small. Not only will a dominant benchmark
provider lack adequate incentive to promulgate additional benchmarks, it
might also fail to invest in improvements to the existing benchmark.178 For
example, LIBOR was reported for multiple currencies and multiple tenors
(term periods) for years.179 Certain combinations were extremely thinly
traded, and bankers often fabricated estimates when surveyed.180 This was
not (always) due to the attempt to manipulate, but simply due to lack of
underlying data. And yet, perhaps because of LIBOR’s dominance, no
participant thought it worthwhile to consider alternative reporting
mechanisms. And why would they? No financial benefit would have come
of the added effort. Rauterberg and Verstein have argued that the fact that
most benchmarks were created as byproducts of their providers’ businesses
reduces these incentives even further, as does the fact that these benchmark

174. See Clayton P. Gillette, Lock-In Effects in Law and Norms, 78 B.U. L. REV. 813 (1998);
Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L.
REV. 479, 562–86 (1998); Rauterberg & Verstein, Index Theory, supra note 9, at 43 (“Some users
may prefer a malproduced or manipulated index to one that is less liquid or well-known.”); Joseph
Farrell & Paul Klemperer, Coordination and Lock-In: Competition with Switching Costs and
Network Effects (May 2006) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=917785.
175. See Klausner, supra note 113, at 815 (discussing this phenomenon in the context of
contracts).
176. Williams, supra note 21.
177. See, e.g., Levine, The Libor Change Is Coming, supra note 66, at 2.
178. Katz & Shapiro, supra note 125, at 106 (describing how firms’ incentives to innovate are
changed when network effects exist).
179. See
The
Basics,
BBALIBOR,
https://web.archive.org/web/20120121102345/
http://www.bbalibor.com/bbalibor-explained/the-basics (last visited Feb. 2, 2020).
180. See Rauterberg & Verstein, Index Theory, supra note 9, at 48–49 (describing this
phenomenon for the eleven-month Swedish krona).
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providers currently do not charge for use of their benchmarks, an issue
explored further in Part IV.C.181
Overall, this means that even if users would prefer to switch away from
the most widely used benchmark, the lack of viable alternatives effectively
locks them into the single existing benchmark, even if it is faulty or outdated.
This can also help explain, for example, why no “tamper-proof” benchmark
evolved on its own—the choice to promulgate any additional benchmark will
be distorted by the tradeoff between the immediate benefits conferred by
using an established, if suboptimal benchmark, and the benefits of an
alternative benchmark with uncertain, possibly non-existent, network
benefits and even potential costs.182 As previously alluded to, markets with
network effects can see substantial path dependence, and as more and more
transactions reference a few benchmarks, “lock-in” can easily occur, as each
iterative decision may “look[] optimal given past decisions, but is suboptimal if earlier investment decisions had been delayed and all the decisions
were taken at once.”183 It becomes difficult, and a risky financial endeavor,
to “coordinat[e] the simultaneous defection of large numbers of” market
participants.184
D. “Default” Benchmarks
At this point, it is useful to address the potential counterargument that
rents resulting from the structures described above are costs that the market
is willing to tolerate in return for the flexibility provided by OTC markets,
and that sophisticated entities have determined the extant structures to be the
most efficient for their purposes. This argument would follow from the
dominant paradigm in law and economics, which assumes that agents engage
in welfare-maximizing behavior with one another, without significant effects
on third parties, reaching optimal contractual arrangements that lower the
cost of transacting or attaining equilibria that are overall socially optimal
given achievable alternatives.185 Indeed, this view prevailed for much of the
history of OTC market (de)regulation.
Regulators viewed market
participants as “sophisticated and informed,” and as such, best positioned to
181. See id. Network effects have been known to cause similar effects in exchange selfregulation. Craig Pirrong has observed that self-regulation among exchange members is less likely
when the exchanges do not bear the full costs or internalize the benefits from manipulation or
wrongdoing. See Stephen Craig Pirrong, The Self-Regulation of Commodity Exchanges: The Case
of Market Manipulation, 38 J.L. & ECON. 141, 157, 164 (1995) [hereinafter “Pirrong, SelfRegulation”].
182. See Klausner, supra note 113, at 790–91 (describing this phenomenon in product markets).
183. See supra Part II.B.4; Economides, supra note 110, at 23; see also generally Farrell &
Klemperer, supra note 174.
184. Pirrong, Self-Regulation, supra note 181, at 155.
185. See Klausner, supra note 113, for a general description of this theory.
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assess risks and rewards in financial transactions, with a dealer market
perceived as “highly efficient” in hedging risk, among other activities.186 As
a result, regulators have historically deferred to the consequent transactional
arrangements seen in OTC markets.
But this model does not capture the whole story. Importantly, there is a
countervailing phenomenon, and one that scholars such as Klausner,
Economides, and Ian Domowitz have pointed out in the contracting,
products, and trading contexts: assuming that observed equilibria are the
most optimal ones is not always prudent, and less so when network effects
exert strong pulls.187 In a similar vein, Scott has pointed out that in
multilateral markets, the very “factors that generate efficiencies in the
production of contracts—standardization and economies of scale—are the
same factors that produce inefficiencies in the very contract terms that parties
rely on to motivate performance.”188
In other words, simply because OTC markets have historically been
dominated by private ordering does not necessarily mean that the results of
such private orders are indicative of optimal or efficient outcomes, and the
persistence or dominance of certain benchmarks should not be taken to
necessarily indicate their desirability.
Instead, as we have seen, benchmark-dominated markets tend to
promote network formation, which can lock in potentially distortive or
suboptimal structures. Moreover, the pull of network effects and existing
power structures will likely deter any single actor from acting differently.
While an institution such as Delta is certainly not powerless or
unsophisticated, its informational capabilities (at least vis-à-vis a dealer such
as Goldman Sachs) and ability to coordinate with other end users is limited,
creating collective action issues. Nor are there currently sufficient incentives
for additional benchmarks or providers to enter the market or improve
existing benchmarks. This is explored more fully in the next Part.

186. Letter from Donald L. E. Ritger to Senator Herman E. Talmadge, Chairman of the Senate
Comm. on Agric. and Forestry (1974), reprinted in U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 5887–89.
187. See Domowitz, supra note 125, at 167; Klausner, supra note 113, at 814–15, 830 (“If
network externalities are present, . . . actual contracts are imperfect indicators of optimal
contracts.”); Economides, supra note 110, at 23.
188. Robert Scott, The Paradox of Contracting in Markets, 83 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 71, 72
(2020) (also pointing out that “the reverse is true: the factors that produce more efficient contract
design—bespoke efforts to motivate investment and trade—are the same factors that generate the
loss of scale and the resulting inefficiencies in the production of contracts”). As Scott notes, because
standardization of contracts lowers contracting costs and results in more reliable terms, network
benefits result, making it easier for markets to price the contract, further lowering transaction costs,
and so forth. Id. at 77–78. As this occurs, inefficiencies in boilerplate become ossified, and lack of
coordination prevents markets from self-correcting. Id. at 77–84.
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IV. IMPLICATIONS AND REFORM
The above discussion illustrates in detail how certain structures in
benchmark markets and accompanying path dependencies can encourage
inefficient lock-in and facilitate wrongdoing, and why such effects are
especially potent when markets are otherwise opaque, decentralized, and
dominated by a few powerful players. “Systemically” important benchmarks
may result; incentives to monitor wrongdoing can weaken; and so long as a
benchmark remains so entrenched in an ecosystem dominated by powerful
institutions, there is little likelihood of innovation or competition from
socially beneficial alternative benchmarks, and market-based discipline will
remain ineffective.
This Part interrogates the optimal “default” benchmark structures in
OTC markets. In addition to the enforcement or governance-based reforms
proposed by others, which overwhelmingly assume that a single benchmark
will continue to dominate, this Part advocates for a more fundamental
approach, and proposes an alternative competitive equilibrium—one where
multiple benchmarks compete.
To be clear, this Article does not advocate wholesale restructuring of
OTC markets. There are, as set out above, defensible reasons for the
dominance of large dealers. Their cost of providing liquidity in bespoke,
decentralized markets remains far lower than that of end users and, for the
most part, end users benefit from dealers’ expertise and the ease with which
they are able to take on and hedge risks. The inquiry focuses instead on the
distortions caused by the dominance of certain benchmark rates as they
interact with OTC market structures, and the implications for credible private
market discipline. It is unrealistic to expect counterparties to credibly
demand better behavior from dealers. As discussed above, counterparties are
diffuse, suffer from coordination problems, and usually make use of OTC
markets for discrete transactions or for discrete business needs. It is also
risky to continue relying on the incentives of dealers, as doing so is sensible
only so long as those dealers’ incentives are aligned with the markets’ as a
whole.
Instead, with the understanding that benchmark weaknesses began with
the basic market forces that gave rise to benchmark development, the above
insights help illuminate an important avenue for reform: the expansion of
benchmark choices. This would, I argue, better align private incentives with
more socially optimal outcomes. In considering this proposal, this Part first
considers other existing reform proposals. Second, it explores the benefits to
benchmark competition. Finally, it discusses mechanisms for transition.
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A. Existing Benchmark Alternatives
Existing benchmark reform proposals overwhelmingly contemplate that
a single benchmark rate will continue to dominate. Before addressing this
Article’s main proposal, to increase the number of benchmarks, it is worth
reviewing the existing proposals. As discussed below, these largely fall into
three buckets—refining the calculation methodology of existing benchmarks,
relying on enforcement and compliance to improve benchmark governance,
and turning to the government to provide and oversee benchmarks.
The first category, which focuses on calculation methodology reform,
is a worthy endeavor. The majority of such proposals advocate enlarging
sampling windows or randomizing samples, such as by widening the window
during which transactions may affect a benchmark setting, as in the case of
the WM/Reuters FX benchmark rates, or turning to a transactions-based
methodology and eliminating submission components of a benchmark, as
with the ICE swap rate.189 Any of these reforms would almost certainly
reduce a benchmark’s susceptibility to manipulation, but they are not without
their own costs. Studies have shown that, for example, widening the
sampling window for the WM/Reuters FX benchmark calculation has
introduced tracking error and potentially lowered the utility of such a rate to
end users.190 Moreover, total immunity to manipulation is impossible, and
attempting to achieve it would be exceedingly costly. Expecting that current
benchmark administrators bear such costs runs into the same incentive
problems discussed in this Article.191
Enforcement and compliance will no doubt remain an important part of
discipline. However, the patchwork applicability of fraud, manipulation,
antitrust regimes, and difficulty or impossibility of measuring harm or
disgorging profits, as alluded to in Part III.B, pose a significant obstacle to
either ex ante deterrence or ex post discipline.192 There have been some
excellent proposals to address this and refine ex post governance. Verstein
has proposed that benchmarks be protected as price reports under the
Commodity Exchange Act,193 Gregory Scopino has argued for an expansion

189. See, e.g., Foreign Exchange Benchmarks: Final Report, FIN. STABILITY BD. 23–31 (Sept.
30, 2014), https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/r_140930.pdf (observing recommendations for
reforming calculation methodologies for FX benchmarks); Benchmark Statement: ICE Swap Rate,
INTERCONTINENTAL
EXCH.
1–2
(last
updated
Oct.
19,
2020)
https://www.theice.com/publicdocs/ISR_Benchmark_statement.pdf (describing the transition from
being a polled submission-based rate to a transactions-based one).
190. Evans, O’Neill, Rime & Saakvitne, supra note 87, at 1–2, 37.
191. See generally Rauterberg & Verstein, Index Theory, supra note 9.
192. See supra Part III.B.
193. See Verstein, Benchmark Manipulation, supra note 12, at 261–62.

42

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 80:1

of the Commodity Exchange Act’s antitrust reach,194 and Rosa M. AbrantesMetz, Rauterberg and Verstein advocate for the use of empirical tools such
as manipulation screens in pleading.195 Gina-Gail S. Fletcher has proposed a
framework modeled on self-regulatory organizations, where a nongovernmental organization would have disciplinary authority over
members—benchmark administrators and data contributors—with
regulatory oversight from either the United States Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”) or the CFTC.196 While these proposals certainly merit
consideration, a closer look reveals that the confusion runs deeper.
For one, and as recognized by other scholars, the legal frameworks that
exist—fraud, antitrust, and manipulation—are both over- and underinclusive.197 With respect to fraud, the workhorse elements—material
misstatement or omission, intent, reliance and harm—are difficult to
prove.198 Enforcement under the securities laws has all but collapsed the
concept of manipulation into that of fraud.199 Antitrust laws demand an
injury to the forces of competition itself.200 Were dealers in a competitive
process? Interestingly, civil plaintiffs and the CFTC had diametrically
opposing theories of wrongdoing in the ISDAFIX cases. Plaintiffs alleged
an antitrust conspiracy, while the CFTC fined dealers for unilateral
manipulation.201 Finally, stand-alone manipulation—poorly defined in
regulation and statute—includes an intent element that is almost comically
difficult to prove.202 Outstanding questions abound. If a transaction is
motivated at least in part by a legitimate reason, can it ever be manipulative?
Does manipulation require deceit? Is an artificial price required? What
constitutes an artificial price? These questions plague scholars, courts, and
194. See Gregory Scopino, Expanding the Reach of the Commodity Exchange Act’s Antitrust
Considerations, 45 HOFSTRA L. REV. 573 (2016).
195. See Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz, Gabriel Rauterberg & Andrew Verstein, Revolution in
Manipulation Law: The New CFTC Rules and the Urgent Need for Economic and Empirical
Analysis, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 357 (2013).
196. See Fletcher, supra note 9, at 1937–40.
197. See, e.g., Verstein, Benchmark Manipulation, supra note 12, at 252–59.
198. Indeed, courts are split on whether open market trading behavior can ever constitute
manipulation. Compare GFL Advantage Fund, Ltd. v. Colkitt, 272 F.3d 189, 205 (3d Cir. 2001),
with Markowski v. SEC, 274 F.3d 525, 529 (D.C. Cir. 2001). See also Verstein, Benchmark
Manipulation, supra note 12, at 252–53.
199. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977) (“[Manipulation] refers
generally to practices, such as wash sales, matched orders, or rigged prices, that are intended to
mislead investors by artificially affecting market activity.”); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S.
185, 199 (1976) (characterizing manipulation as “conduct designed to deceive or defraud
investors”).
200. Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–38.
201. See Alaska Elec. Pension Fund v. Bank of America N.A., 175 F. Supp. 3d 44 (S.D.N.Y.
2016); Press Release No. 7794-18, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, supra note 157. ’
202. See Abrantes-Metz, Rauterberg & Verstein, supra note 195, at 369, 375–85.
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regulators—and will continue to do so as long as these frameworks are not
updated to reflect current market practices. Indeed, the European General
Court recently overturned a 33.6 million euro fine imposed against HSBC by
the European Commission, stating that the regulator provided “insufficient
reasoning” for the fine.203
The confusion across legal regimes has been echoed in the defenses
proffered by traders and banks, who routinely plead that they did not think
they were acting inappropriately.204 Indeed, some forms of manipulation,
such as that concerning the WM/Reuters FX benchmark, could plausibly be
cast as pre-trade hedging.205 And there is certainly sympathy in the law for
trading activity that comprises legitimate hedging activity.206 Regardless of
the ultimate credibility of such defenses, that they are put forth at all helps
highlight larger difficulties of policing “new” forms of financial wrongdoing.
Relying solely on compliance levers within a firm and adjusting them after
wrongdoing comes to light will always be reactive, and often miss some
category of misconduct. Compliance is most effective when the conduct is
clearly prohibited ex ante.
Nor do such proposals address the problem of regulatory capture due to
the systemic importance of a benchmark, as occurred with LIBOR in 2008.
A failure of governance due to the overwhelming importance of a single
aspect of the financial system cannot be solved simply by tweaking legal
frameworks.
Relying on the government as a benchmark provider (similar to utility
provision) is also problematic, and likely to be slow, cumbersome, and costly.
Nor is there any guarantee the government will get it “right.” As a specific
example, let us consider the slow path to reforming LIBOR. A decade after
203. Hugo Miller, HSBC’s Gamble Pays Off as $37 Million Euribor Fine Scrapped,
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 24, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-09-24/hsbc-winseu-court-fight-over-37m-fine-for-euribor-rigging.
204. See, e.g., Enrich, supra note 16 (noting that defendant Hayes stated he was “very, very, very
open, very transparent,” that “[a]ll [his] managers knew,” and that he “had no reason to think that it
was wrong”).
205. See, e.g., Citibank – Final Notice, FIN. CONDUCT AUTH. 7–8 (Nov. 11, 2014),
https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/final-notices/final-notice-citi-bank.pdf (“A firm legitimately
managing the risk arising from its net client orders at the fix rate may make a profit or a loss from
its associated trading in the market. Such trading can, however, potentially influence the fix rate.
For example, a firm buying a large volume of currency in the market just before or during the fix
may cause the fix rate to move higher.”); Levine, Banks Manipulated Foreign Exchange’, supra
note 151(explaining the blurry line between manipulation and hedging). Nor did the conduct at
issue here occur in the dead of night, where traders were engaging in obviously illegal conduct that
harmed their employers as well as the market. See, e.g., Kadhim Shubber & David Keohane,
SocGen Executives Ordered Libor Rigging, US Prosecutors Believed, FIN. TIMES (June 7, 2018)
https://www.ft.com/content/05dfb112-6a53-11e8-b6eb-4acfcfb08c11.
206. See, e.g., CFTC v. Wilson & DRW Investments, No. 13 Civ. 7884 (RJS), 2018 WL 6322024
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2018).
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the actual manipulation, the U.S., the U.K., Europe, Japan, and Switzerland
have only just begun to creakily transition to a designated alternative.207
These alternatives are not scheduled to fully replace their country’s Interbank
Offered Rate (“IBOR”) until 2021 at the earliest, when the BBA is expected
to cease production of LIBOR.208 In the U.S., regulators have settled on the
Secured Overnight Financing Rate (“SOFR”), a measurement of banks’
overnight borrowing rate (secured by Treasury securities), as the sole
designated LIBOR replacement.209 LIBOR had flaws, to be sure. But so too
does SOFR: the markets for SOFR can be finicky and overly sensitive to
funding market idiosyncrasies, such as the due date for corporate taxes,
Treasury securities entering the market for unrelated reasons, and the level
of a bank’s reserves. For example, on September 17, 2019, SOFR jumped
three percentage points in a single day, a huge amount for an index rate,
simply because corporate investors’ tax obligations coincided with a large
net Treasury issuance.210
Nor should SOFR, a secured overnight rate based on repurchase
agreement transactions, be viewed as a perfect, or necessarily even close,
substitute for LIBOR, a credit-sensitive term rate. Importantly, SOFR is
backward-looking, while LIBOR is forward-looking by embedding banks’
estimations of their borrowing costs, which are inherently future-oriented.211
For many borrowers, interest rates pegged to future economic movements
will be much more useful than those that lag the market.212 These differences
mean that, should market participants in fact fully transition to SOFR, they
will need to understand and calculate multiple, dynamic mathematical
relationships between the two rates for many contracts with payment
obligations extending far into the future.213 Any issues will be exacerbated
207. See Dan McCrum, Life After Libor, a Cut-Out-and-Keep Guide, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2018),
https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2018/04/06/1523007997000/Life-after-Libor—a-cut-out-and-keepguide/.
208. See id.
209. See Matt Levine, Libor’s Replacement Is a Little Too Real, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 13, 2019),
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-02-13/libor-s-replacement-sofr-is-a-little-tooreal. [hereinafter Levine, Libor’s Replacement]
210. See, e.g., Matt Levine, Interest Rates Shouldn’t Be Interesting, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 18,
2018),
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-09-18/interest-rates-shouldn-t-beinteresting; [hereinafter Levine, Interest Rates]; Levine, Libor’s Replacement, supra note 209.
211. See Andreas Schrimpf & Vladyslav Sushko, Beyond LIBOR: A Primer on the New
Reference Rates, BIS Q. REV. 43 (2019).
212. See id.
213. See, e.g., Marcus Burnett, Response to AARC’s Consultation on Potential Spread
Adjustments, SOFR ACADEMY (Mar. 25, 2020), https://sofracademy.com/response-to-arrcsconsultation-on-potential-spread-adjustments/. While ISDA recently promoted relying on a fiveyear median of the historical difference between LIBOR and the SOFR fallback rate, this spread is
certainly not one size fits all, as some market participants are already concerned it will not work for
them.
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because the main players in OTC markets—banks—are better off when they
can match their lending revenue with their borrowing costs. LIBOR, which
measures precisely banks’ cost of borrowing from each other, was actually
an excellent rate at which to lend: banks’ revenue from loans given out at
LIBOR would match their cost of borrowing from each other, allowing a
match between assets and liabilities.214 Thus, “if a bank wants to sell an
adjustable rate mortgage, defining its cost as a spread over LIBOR allows it
to minimize its basis risk between the rate it charges the consumer and the
cost of the bank’s funds.”215 The introduction of SOFR will create basis risk
between a bank’s borrowing costs and its lending revenue (now tied to
SOFR).216 It is not a stretch to imagine that any additional risks will be passed
on to end users (for example, Delta and its customers) in the form of higher
costs. These uncertainties will create additional risk for financial
transactions—risk that the government is likely ill-equipped to advise on or
manage.217 Moreover, in a crisis, a rate such as LIBOR has proven a much
better measure of cost of borrowing than a risk-free rate, a concern that some
banks specifically flagged to regulators in 2019.218 The impact of COVID19 illustrates this: LIBOR and SOFR diverged substantially in value, as the
two benchmarks responded to very different market stimuli.219 If banks’

214. See Levine, Banks Will Miss Libor, supra note 10.
215. Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz & David S. Evans, Will the Wheatley Recommendations Fix
LIBOR? 3 (Nov. 29, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2182855.
216. See, e.g., Schrimpf & Sushko, supra note 211, at 41, 45 (also noting that SOFR-notes issuers
would then turn around and hedge with LIBOR-SOFR basis swaps).
217. See, e.g., CFTC Letter No. 19-26, Division of Swap Dealer and Intermediary Oversight
(Dec. 17, 2019) (entitled “No-Action Positions to Facilitate an Orderly Transition of Swaps from
Inter-Bank Offered Rates to Alternative Benchmarks”); CFTC Letter No. 19-27, Division of Market
Oversight (Dec. 17, 2019) (entitled “Staff No-Action Relief from the Trade Execution Requirement
to Facilitate an Orderly Transition from Inter-Bank Offered Rates to Alternative Risk-Free Rates”);
CFTC Letter No. 19-28, Division of Clearing and Risk (Dec. 17, 2019) (entitled “Staff No-Action
Relief from the Swap Clearing Requirement for Amendments to Legacy Uncleared Swaps to
Facilitate Orderly Transition from Inter-Bank Offered Rates to Alternative Risk-Free Rates”).
218. See Marcus Burnett, How Regional Banks Could Shape US LIBOR Replacement, RISK.NET
(Apr. 21, 2020), https://www.risk.net/comment/7527776/how-regional-banks-could-shape-uslibor-replacement (noting the formation of the Credit Sensitivity Group by regulators in response to
banks’ concerns); Abrantes-Metz & Evans, supra note 215, at 3.
219. See Jeffrey Armstrong, COVID-19 Crisis Exposes Libor Replacement’s Weaknesses,
LAW360 (Mar. 27, 2020), https://www.law360.com/articles/1256813/covid-19-crisis-exposeslibor-replacement-s-weaknesses (“By contrast, while USD 3-month Libor initially fell substantially
and quickly moved below 3-month SOFR, it then abruptly reversed course and began a sharp climb.
Every day since March 12 [until March 27], the two benchmarks have moved in opposite directions.
The increasing USD 3-month Libor is likely responding to some degree to perceived elevated
banking system risk. On the other hand, 3-month SOFR appears to be responding to a combination
of U.S. Federal Reserve liquidity intervention and the flight to safe-haven U.S. Treasury
securities.”).
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funding costs were high while their lending revenue remained low, they
would be exposed to enormous basis risk.220
Not only may the government suffer from lack of expertise,221 it will
always have its own agenda.222 The SOFR example also illustrates that the
story is not one simply about conflicts of interest. If it were, simply divorcing
the benchmark providers from dealers who are counterparties to indexed
transactions would seem an obvious solution. But as this Article has shown,
there are legitimate reasons to keep dealers involved in both benchmark
setting and as counterparties to indexed transactions—not least because of
market efficiencies produced through their information and expertise.223
Doing so, as pointed out by others, would also likely result in
underproduction of benchmarks.224 Nor would such a proscription
adequately address issues such as suboptimality or a systemically important
benchmark.
Thus, we have, again, a benchmark that is likely suboptimal, where
markets, again, have no real alternative. To wit, regulators continue to issue
COVID-19 loans with timelines extending years into the future tied not to
SOFR, but to LIBOR.225
Nor is it clear that SOFR would be immune to manipulation (a
transactions-based index is by itself certainly no guarantee of integrity, as the
WM/Reuters foreign exchange manipulation has taught us). Instead, why not
have a LIBOR-like rate and SOFR? Eighty percent of market participants
surveyed in 2017 in fact preferred that LIBOR remain.226

220. See Burnett, supra note 218; Marcus Burnett, For Businesses Libor Transition Efforts Must
Move Ahead, SOFR ACADEMY (Apr. 18, 2020), https://sofracademy.com/for-businesses-libortransition-efforts-must-move-ahead/.
221. See, e.g., Farrell & Klemperer, supra note 174, at 93 (concluding governments are best
suited to provide standards in industries without rapid innovation, such as driving, currency, weights
and measures and so on, but cautioning against government standards in cases where competing
standards are unclear, the government may lack expertise, or where the industry is rapidly evolving).
222. See, e.g., Rauterberg & Verstein, Index Theory, supra note 9, at 38 (noting that “many
market participants flocked to Libor precisely to avoid government-controlled indices”) (citing
Michael Carsella, The LIBOR Controversy Part II: Focusing Attention on Basis Risk and Loan
Profitability,
SECURED
LENDER,
May/June
2010,
at
44,
45,
http://www.thesecuredlenderdigital.com/thesecuredlender/20100506#pg46.
223. Abrantes-Metz and Evans also recognize this in noting that by placing lawyers and
compliance officers in charge of setting LIBOR, the Wheatley recommendations substantially
reduce LIBOR’s flexibility and representativeness in response to changing market conditions.
Abrantes-Metz & Evans, supra note 215, at 6.
224. See Rauterberg & Verstein, Index Theory, supra note 9, at 49.
225. See Libor Goes from Dying to in Demand with Fed Pushing Fast Loans, AM. BANKER (May
6, 2020), https://www.americanbanker.com/articles/libor-goes-from-dying-to-in-demand-with-fedpushing-fast-loans.
226. See, e.g., Schrimpf & Sushko, supra note 211, at 47.
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The point is not one about SOFR’s suitability as a replacement for
LIBOR (although that is certainly in question).227 SOFR may be better suited
for certain transactions.228 Instead, the point is to illustrate that a one-sizefits-all benchmark is not a realistic goal—and staying within that paradigm
will likely only replicate existing problems or result in unanticipated and
unnecessary cost and risk to the financial system. While reform to calculation
methodology can certainly make it more difficult to manipulate benchmarks,
doing so only targets one aspect of the problem. Compliance-based systems
risk failing to anticipate wrongdoing before the fact. Existing legal
frameworks are plainly insufficient. Reliance solely on enforcement is also
unlikely to be sufficient, for reasons made clear by the capture of regulators
in 2008 regarding LIBOR manipulation. Nor would a prohibition on
benchmark provision by the same entities who are counterparties to
transactions referencing those benchmarks make sense—doing so would
likely reduce incentives to participate in a benchmark setting so severely that
benchmarks would simply disappear. Government provision of benchmarks
is likely to be slow, costly, and cumbersome. The pathologies identified in
this Article are deeper and begin with OTC market structures and incentives
themselves. The next Part discusses the potential significant benefits to
having more than one benchmark.
B. Benefits to Competition
Competition can have significant benefits for participants market-wide
and increase efficiency, by incentivizing socially beneficial innovation,
fostering transparency and better information, and encouraging entry by more
efficient providers.229 With respect to OTC benchmark markets in particular,
even if dealers remain dominant due to natural accumulation of expertise,
additional benchmarks can lead to benchmarks that are more tailored,
nimbler, less systemically important, and less tempting and more difficult to
manipulate.
227. See Daniel Kruger & Vipal Monga, Repo-Market Tumult Raises Concerns About New
Benchmark Rate: Volatility in Funding Markets Sparks a Jump in the Rate that the Fed Has
Proposed to Replace LIBOR, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 23, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/repomarket-tumult-raises-concerns-about-new-benchmark-rate-11569247352.
228. See, e.g., Schrimpf & Sushko, supra note 211, at 43 (noting that SOFR is better suited when
market participants are more concerned with avoiding volatility).
229. See, e.g., Competition and Financial Markets: Key Findings, ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV. (2009), https://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/43067294.pdf. For an
account of the costs of concentrated markets, see, e.g., Rory Van Loo, Making Innovation More
Competitive: The Case of Fintech, 65 UCLA L. REV. 232, 247 (2018); Economides, supra note
110, at 3-4; Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Commissioner, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, “Competition: The
Forgotten
Fourth
Pillar
of
the
SEC’s
Mission”’
(Oct.
11,
2018),
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-jackson-101118 (noting that concentration in financial
markets correlates with higher costs for participants).
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First, the addition of benchmarks would cut down on the number of
transactions tied to any given benchmark. This could reduce incentives to
manipulate by lowering the potential upside to doing so. For example, two
interest rate benchmarks might halve the potential gains to Citibank and
JPMorgan from a 25 basis point (0.25%) change in LIBOR discussed in Part
III.B. So long as a single benchmark dominates huge market segments, there
will be a significant incentive to manipulate.230 This is, of course, assuming
that additional benchmarks could be created that are more resilient to
manipulation in calculation methods. Similarly, to the extent there are fixed
costs to wrongdoing, increasing the number of benchmarks might increase
the overall costs of cheating and make it less attractive. This would be
especially true for transaction-based benchmarks, a feature that dominates
proposed or ongoing benchmark reforms already. Let us assume that there
are costs to manipulating a single benchmark, for example, the WM/Reuters
FX rate. If a dealer preferred that the 4 p.m. benchmark set at an artificially
high rate, so that the dealer could sell some currency to its customer at an
inflated rate, the dealer would (simplistically speaking) need to purchase a
sufficient quantity of currency in the small window of time leading up to 4
p.m.231 This is risky and requires resources and effort. If other dealers are in
the market engaging in trades that will tend to move the rate in the opposite
direction, the manipulating dealer will need to exert even more effort to see
their manipulation through. So long as the potential benefits to manipulation
outweigh these costs, however, manipulation will remain tempting.232 If
multiple benchmarks existed and manipulating each additional benchmark
required the same level of effort or risk, the potential costs might quickly
outweigh the benefits (especially if there were fewer transactions tied to a
single benchmark, and a consequent reduction in potential gain from a single
manipulation). And, beyond the costs to engaging in the mechanics of
manipulation, there may be reputation costs, personnel costs, and so forth.
Thus, if multiple benchmarks co-existed, manipulation might become less
attractive ex ante.
Second, additional benchmarks might make market discipline more
effective by lowering the cost of switching for end users. Currently, market
participants are stuck with a single benchmark, even if that benchmark is
faulty, prone to manipulation, or known to be manipulated. For example, its
awareness of LIBOR’s manipulation did not stop the U.S. Treasury from

230. Duffie & Stein, supra note 11, at 211.
231. See, e.g., Levine, Banks Manipulated Foreign Exchange’, supra note 151.
232. See, e.g., Brian Coulter, Joel Shapiro & Peter Zimmerman, A Mechanism for LIBOR, HARV.
L.
SCH.
FORUM
ON
CORP.
GOVERNANCE
(Oct.
29,
2017),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/10/29/a-mechanism-for-libor/.
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issuing TARP loans indexed to LIBOR during the financial crisis.233 Nor is
it stopping regulators from issuing COVID-19-related loans linked to LIBOR
today.234 Contrast this with the equities markets, where indices operate in a
multiple-benchmark competitive equilibrium that allows investors and
institutions to select the index that best fits their needs, switching away from
suboptimal benchmarks as prudent. For example, the S&P 500, the Dow
Jones, NASDAQ, Russell 2000 all serve to provide varying but similar
measures of the stock markets’ performance. If the Dow Jones were
compromised, alternatives exist that make the prospect of opting out of
referencing the Dow Jones more realistic and comparatively much less
costly. This also illustrates a related point about comparability between
benchmarks: while this Article advocates for benchmarks that are more
tailored, this would not necessarily come at the cost of comparability between
benchmarks, as illustrated both by the coexistence of multiple equities
indices as well as comparisons drawn between LIBOR and SOFR as
discussed in the previous Part.
Similarly, additional benchmarks and consequently less widespread
hardwiring of a single benchmark could reduce a benchmark’s systemic
impact and loosen powerful dealers’ influence over regulatory behavior.
Multiple benchmarks, simply because each one would be less widely
referenced, could reduce the systemic risk posed by any single benchmark.
And, if a single benchmark became compromised, regulators may be less
hesitant to publicly discipline those responsible when there are others whose
integrity remains intact. In other words, a situation such as the one in 2008,
where Bank of England regulators appear to have implicitly blessed LIBOR
manipulation for fear of undermining confidence in the banks, could be
avoided. One could also hypothesize that such pathologies might not infect
stock indices. If the S&P 500 were compromised, markets would
conceivably understand to discount its numbers and much more easily look
toward another index as a reference; or if production of the Dow Jones
ceased, the likelihood of systemic market risk ensuing would be far lower.
Additional benchmarks could also reduce the tendency towards
suboptimal standardization. As noted above, there is emerging evidence that
a single dominant benchmark is not always optimal. To return to the LIBOR
example, it is not clear that LIBOR is itself necessarily the most desirable
benchmark in some cases.235 Darrell Duffie and Jeremy Stein have pointed
233. See Verstein, Benchmark Manipulation, supra note 12, at 266.
234. See Libor Goes from Dying to in Demand with Fed Pushing Fast Loans, AM. BANKER (May
6, 2020), https://www.americanbanker.com/articles/libor-goes-from-dying-to-in-demand-with-fedpushing-fast-loans.
235. Duffie & Stein, supra note 11, at 195. Similar phenomena have been observed in other
markets: for example, participants might select a suboptimal contract term that does not maximize
the value of their contract but which is standardized and thus will benefit from network effects,
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out the suboptimal nature of LIBOR as a reference rate used across the
entirety of the interest rate derivatives market.236 They have posited that, “if
we could start the world from scratch, we would aim for a two-rate model,
with a transactions-based LIBOR+ serving as the reference rate for most onbalance-sheet bank lending contracts, and with some low-credit-risk
reference rate . . . serving as the reference rate for the majority of interestrate derivatives.”237 Similarly, in identifying suboptimal aspects of LIBOR,
Rebecca Tabb and Joseph Grundfest have observed some shift away from
unsecured interbank lending in markets more broadly, and that an
environment comprising several benchmarks co-existing with LIBOR may
be more optimal: “it makes little sense, on a prospective basis, to require a
single substitute for LIBOR when the market may rationally prefer any of
several viable alternatives.”238 Thus, we can move away from a world in
which LIBOR, or a dominant benchmark, meets all market needs poorly,
towards one where multiple benchmarks can each meet a specific market
need more optimally.239
Further empirical work could be undertaken on this score, in particular
with respect to whether a single benchmark may in fact represent an optimal
equilibrium. Thus far, with the exception of a few commentators, the idea
that markets may benefit from a greater variety of benchmarks has not
received sufficient scholarly or regulatory attention. For example, the first
major step to overhaul the LIBOR submission system, the Wheatley Report,
undertaken in the U.K., involved consideration of alternative benchmarks,
including, among others, the Sterling Overnight Index Average and the
Overnight Index Swap rates and repurchasing agreement rates.240 But the
Wheatley Report ultimately recommended maintaining LIBOR, in large part
lowering the levels of uncertainty and making the contract easier to price. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi
& Mitu Gulati, Innovation in Boilerplate Contracts: An Empirical Examination of Sovereign Bonds
53 EMORY L.J. 929, 930–31 (2004).
236. Duffie & Stein, supra note 11, at 192 (documenting the “accident of history” where market
participants continually chose to trade in higher liquidity markets, which has led to a “massive
agglomeration of trade based on the IBOR benchmarks”).
237. Id. at 209.
238. Rebecca Tabb & Joseph A. Grundfest, Alternatives to Libor, 8 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 229, 230
(2013); Floyd Norris, Finding A Rate That’s Fairer Than Libor, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2013),
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/05/business/steering-a-better-course-past-the-fiction-oflibor.html?ref=business&_r=0 (“Libor has clearly become ridiculous. But long before that
happened, it became ubiquitous.”).
239. See Tabb & Grundfest, supra note 238, at 26 (“Indeed, one of the ironies of LIBOR is that,
despite meeting the needs of different segments of the market imperfectly and potentially less well
than alternatives, LIBOR’s ubiquity in diverse market settings provides it a dominant market
position with network effects that are challenging for alternatives to overcome.”).
240. The Wheatley Review of LIBOR: Final Report, HM TREASURY (2012),
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/191762/wheatley_r
eview_libor_finalreport_280912.pdf.
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due to its sheer dominance.241 Since then, governments have only slowly
moved to replacing LIBOR. The United States, U.K., Europe, Japan, and
Switzerland have begun to creakily transition to a designated alternative.242
Yet the chosen alternatives are not free from flaws. In the United States, as
discussed, SOFR has been designated as LIBOR’s replacement.243 But as
discussed above, the markets for SOFR can be finicky and prone to
idiosyncratic fluctuations,244 and SOFR may be fundamentally suboptimal in
certain circumstances—especially in times of economic stress—as well.
Indeed, the very reason LIBOR came into existence was to avoid overreliance
on a government-produced index.245
In LIBOR markets, at least a few jurisdictions have since raised the
possibility of transitioning to a two-benchmark status quo, where one is based
on an overnight risk-free rate, while the other incorporates the credit risk
component that enables banks to match their assets with their liabilities (e.g.,
their lending revenues with their borrowing costs).246 In the United States,
the ICE Benchmark Administration has announced the intention to create a
“a forward-looking, credit-sensitive benchmark designed specifically as a
potential replacement for LIBOR for U.S. dollar lending activity,” although
its viability remains uncertain.247 Another benchmark candidate, Ameribor,
seeks to reflect the “the actual borrowing costs of thousands of small,
medium, and regional banks across America.”248 There currently seems to
be a window for innovation, one in which it makes sense to encourage
benchmark competition, rather than simply let markets deal with the
expensive fallout from transitioning to SOFR or relying on other suboptimal
short term interest rates, such as the prime rate (which is a good deal more
expensive than LIBOR), both of which would likely impose costs across the

241. See id.
242. See McCrum, supra note 207.
243. Transition from LIBOR, supra note 17.
244. See, e.g., Schrimpf & Sushko, supra note 211, at 38–39 (observing SOFR’s volatility
caused by Treasury market fluctuations and bank and corporate balance sheet management); Levine,
Interest Rates, supra note 210.
245. See Rauterberg & Verstein, Index Theory, supra note 9, at 38.
246. See, e.g., Schrimpf & Sushko, supra note 211, at 45.
247. U.S. Dollar ICE Bank Yield Index Update, ICE BENCHMARK ADMIN. 3 (Oct. 2019),
https://www.theice.com/publicdocs/iba_us_dollar_ice_bank_yield_index_third_update.pdf (“The
Index has been developed to measure the average yields at which investors are willing to invest U.S.
dollar funds over one-month, three-month and six-month periods on a wholesale, senior, unsecured
basis in large, internationally active banks.”).
248. See Ameribor, Background, https://ameribor.net/background; Ameribor, The New
Benchmark, https://ameribor.net/assets/resources/AMERIBOR_Brochure.pdf; Jason Brett, Federal
Reserve Endorses Ethereum-Backed Alternative To Libor, FORBES (June 3, 2020),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jasonbrett/2020/06/03/federal-endorses-ethereum-backedalternative-to-libor/#6c54936c69f3.
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market.249 This relates to another point: the argument that introducing
multiple benchmarks would create additional, unmanageable complexity
ignores the vast amounts of resources that are already being sunk into the
transition from LIBOR to SOFR—including by the government.250 A clumsy
transition risks externalized costs to the whole market.
There is an additional, related benefit to benchmark competition:
reduced risk of the persistence of an outdated benchmark. For example,
while LIBOR may have once reflected borrowing costs in liquid markets,
over time trading in certain segments of the underlying market that LIBOR
was designed to measure became problematically thin.251 Yet the BBA took
no action in response, nor did they have any incentive to. Why incur the costs
of adjusting or updating a benchmark when markets have little ability to cease
reliance on that benchmark? Healthy competition in benchmark markets, on
the other hand, could incentivize beneficial updates in response to changing
market conditions.252 Thus, increased competition could have other
cascading benefits, such as encouraging quality enhancing innovation.
Finally, it is unlikely that additional benchmarks would cause a loss of
the standardization, price-related, and hedging benefits provided by
benchmarks in the first place. This is presuming that markets will likely not
calibrate to an equilibrium with more than a handful of benchmarks (too
many competing benchmarks would undercut much of their standardizing
benefits and run into administrability issues), ensuring that each will still
retain substantial harmonization and pricing benefits. While a full treatment
of this eventuality is beyond the scope of this Article, the example in the
cross-currency swap between Apple and Sony discussed in Part II.C.3 may
be illustrative. There, allowing parties to choose between two interest rate
benchmarks that each maintain some critical threshold of market influence
(rather than defaulting to LIBOR) should not negatively impact harmonizing,
informational, and liquidity benefits of an alternative benchmark.

249. See, e.g., Rauterberg & Verstein, Index Theory, supra note 9, at 39 (noting the perils of
relying on the existence of the prime rate).
250. See, e.g., Reforming Major Interest Rate Benchmarks: Progress Report, FIN. STABILITY
BD. 16-17 (Nov. 14, 2018), https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/P141118-1.pdf; Mark Maurer,
U.S. Companies Advised to Prepare for Multiple Benchmark Rates in Transition from Libor, WALL
ST. J. (Oct. 22, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-companies-advised-to-prepare-formultiple-benchmark-rates-in-transition-from-libor-11571776045 (reporting a $155 billion estimate
in spending to transition away from LIBOR). Indeed, some companies are beginning to realize that
it is simply not practical to expect to graft LIBOR-linked contracts over to SOFR.
251. See, e.g., Hou & Skeie, supra note 144. Verstein notes a similar phenomenon in the markets
for crude oil. Verstein, Benchmark Manipulation, supra note 12, at 244–45.
252. In this vein, Rauterberg and Verstein note that indices produced for profit will be more
likely to “maintain index quality” in response to market pressures. Rauterberg & Verstein, Index
Theory, supra note 9, at 40.
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C. Transition Mechanisms
Retaining the benefits introduced by benchmarks will require ensuring
that the alternative benchmark has enough of a market, meaning that
mechanisms of transition will need to be carefully considered. Of course,
transition toward additional benchmark usage is not a simple process,
especially when network effects are so strong.253 Nor is it the purpose of this
Article to detail a prescription for such processes. However, a few insights
that flow from this Article’s analysis bear mention. First, the introduction of
fees could significantly promote competitive incentives, both to create
additional benchmarks and to adequately innovate around and update
existing ones. Second, the existence of “mix and match” compatibility across
contracts could substantially help support such a system. Finally, regulatory
support may be necessary, as well as support from private market forces such
as ISDA.
Fees could greatly enhance the robustness of a multi-benchmark system
in a few ways. If benchmark promulgators or administrators were to charge
fees, benchmark administrators might be incentivized to create and monitor
rival benchmarks.254 To date, little incentive exists because new benchmark
providers will be forced to internalize all costs with uncertain or partial
benefits.255 The threat of competition as well as the inherent profit-seeking
motives of benchmark administrators might also spur beneficial updates to
existing benchmarks. This parallels Rauterberg and Verstein’s insight that,
because existing benchmarks are largely provided as byproducts of a bank’s
main profit-making activity, the lack of a financial return lowers the incentive
to monitor or innovate.256 It also ties in well with their proposal to bolster
the intellectual property framework to allow benchmark providers to capture
financial gains so as to incentivize better monitoring and quality control.257
Indeed, the scheduled disappearance of LIBOR stems in part from the
unwillingness of banks to continue providing inputs to the daily survey—
253. See, e.g., Levine, Banks Will Miss LIBOR, supra note 10; Joe Rennison, The Loan Market
Loves Libor…, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2018), https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2018/04/09/
1523300140000/The-loan-market-loves-Libor—-/.
254. See Rauterberg & Verstein, Index Theory, supra note 9, at 43 (noting the potential for
market competition to incentivize providers of “product” indices “to maintain quality on pain of
losing their users to another provider”).
255. See Awrey, Private Ordering, supra note 75, at 237.
256. Rauterberg & Verstein, Index Theory, supra note 9, at 51–52 (noting the limitations of
protections for index providers, and the feebleness of the “hot news” and “indices as securities”
protections).
257. Rauterberg and Verstein propose an intellectual property framework to be applied to
benchmarks, arguing that market solutions, enforcement, and governance mechanisms will not
sufficiently incentivize adequate benchmark monitoring. This is because as byproducts, benchmark
providers are not able to internalize the benefits. Thus, they argue for reinstating those protections
to incentivize better index production. See id. at 51–61.
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largely because there is little financial upside and enormous downside due to
unpredictable and expensive enforcement actions.258 Fee-based healthy
competition could introduce enough of a financial incentive for participants
to continue providing inputs. Indeed, fees, or certain kinds of pricing
schemes, are a recognized way of overcoming inefficient inertia.259
Innovation could also be promoted through “mix-and-match
compatibility.”260 As economists have noted, while unequal market power
and monopolies tend to exist in markets with network effects, this is the truest
when there is incompatibility between (potentially) competing networks.261
Domowitz has also done work on this in the exchange context, discussing the
“tipping” required to move from floor trading to electronic trading, noting
the incompatibility between the two.262 This literature has generally
demonstrated that with compatibility, social surplus is greater and
“component” innovation is incentivized.263 This is because compatibility
lowers switching costs and reduces coordination issues.264 Competition
between multiple benchmarks can be thought of similarly, where there is
compatibility between the contracts themselves, but with different
benchmarks, leading to “mix-and-match compatibility [that] encourages
component innovation.”265
This “mix-and-match” compatibility can be observed in the equities
markets. Funds have a plethora of indices to choose from and pay licensing
fees to those such as the S&P 500 for the ability to incorporate their indices.266
Indices such as the Dow Jones Industrial Average and S&P 500 are “products
for sale,” able to generate hundreds of millions of dollars in fees collected
from those wishing to use the index (ETFs, for example).267 As they note,
the “product” nature of equities indices has been able to reduce lock-in
effects, allowing competition to exist between the S&P, the Dow Jones, and
so forth for clients.268

258. Id. at 36 (characterizing this as underproduction).
259. See generally Farrell & Klemperer, supra note 174.
260. See id. at 71.
261. Economides, supra note 110, at 21 (concluding that compatibility is key to increasing
welfare).
262. Domowitz, supra note 125, at 167.
263. See, e.g., Economides, supra note 110, at 14 (noting that consumer surplus, total surplus,
and production profits are generally highest under compatibility).
264. See Farrell & Klemperer, supra note 174, at 6-7.
265. Id. at 71.
266. Rauterberg & Verstein, Index Theory, supra note 9 at 43, 27–28.
267. Id. (calculating that the S&P made almost $22 million in 2010 from a single fund, and
extrapolating it would make around $400 million annually, and noting that MSCI had $350 million
in annual revenue).
268. Id. at 43–44.
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Another lesson can be drawn from the equities universe. Across stock
exchanges, the order protection rule in Regulation National Market System
(“NMS”) prohibits the execution of an order at an exchange if a better quote
exists elsewhere.269 This not only protects investors, but it has the added
benefit of promoting competition between exchanges by ensuring that the
ability of an exchange to receive executions depends on its prices, not on its
size or market power. One could envision an analogous rule in benchmark
markets as follows. Dealers, in pricing contracts to counterparties, might
charge less for incorporating a benchmark that is more widely used. A newer
benchmark will naturally have a smaller network of adoption and may be—
all else being equal—more expensive for an end user to select. A rule
requiring equal pricing for both benchmarks could remove dealers’ ability to
discriminate against a new benchmark on the basis of cost. If the market then
deems that benchmark useful, that benchmark’s barriers to amassing
additional market share are significantly reduced.270
Governments might thus play a role (as they have already).271 Under
regulation in the process of being implemented, the European Union has
begun requiring that (a) benchmark administrators become authorized or
registered, with adequate governance mechanisms in place; (b) benchmark
contributors (of input data) must comply with the benchmark administrator’s
code of conduct and avoid conflicts of interest; and (c) benchmark users only
rely on authorized benchmarks, i.e., those included in the European Securities
and Markets Authority Benchmarks Register.272 Such users will also need to
have in place a written plan for contingency actions in the case of a
benchmark materially changing or ceasing to be provided.273 To the extent it
is feasible, benchmark users must also have an alternative benchmark as a
substitute as necessary.274 The International Organization of Securities
Commissions’ (“IOSCO”) Principles for Benchmarks encourage
similarly.275 One can imagine that other jurisdictions may engage in

269. 17 C.F.R. § 242.611.
270. Fees could also be imposed so as to avoid overly burdening end users, especially if the fees
were imposed asymmetrically onto dealers or onto large institutions. Dealers might be required to
pay some nominal fee to reference a benchmark in a contract, for example. Perhaps this fee would
only be imposed if an institution were of a certain size, mitigating any concern that smaller users
would be negatively impacted in an outsize way.
271. See, e.g., Transition from LIBOR, supra note 17.
272. Benchmarks, EUROPEAN SEC. AND MKTS. AUTH., https://www.esma.europa.eu/policyrules/benchmarks (last visited Feb. 2, 2020).
273. See id.
274. See id.
275. Principles for Financial Benchmarks: Final Report, INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS. 24–25
(July 2013), https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD415.pdf.
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responsive action.276 As they stand, current contracts would either not have
workable alternatives if LIBOR were stopped (such as cash products),
convert to other instruments still tied to LIBOR, or revert to the prime rate
(corporate loans), which would be a lot more expensive than LIBOR.277
However, the kind of registration regime contemplated by the EU could
facilitate the adoption of additional benchmarks.278 Registering with some
centralized repository of “approved” benchmarks and requiring that
benchmark users have contingency plans for alternative benchmarks could
certainly bolster acceptance of alternative benchmarks.279
Nor should the very same institutions—large dealers—that have had
such a profound impact in shaping OTC market structures be overlooked.
Dealers could encourage use of alternative benchmarks, lessening
coordination and switching problems by leveraging the same market forces
that led to such wide adoption of the original benchmarks promulgated.280
For example, one group of institutions with a particularly influential and
dynamic role in the interest rate derivatives market—ISDA—could help
facilitate transition to alternative benchmarks, or lend legitimacy to
additional ones, through the issuances of protocols.281 Currently, many older
ISDA contracts provide that in the event that an IBOR is discontinued,
calculations will depend on quotes obtained from major dealers in the
market.282 This is most obviously problematic because the feasibility of
obtaining such quotes under such circumstances is highly questionable, to
say the least. Contracts often contemplate a long schedule of future payments
conditioned on future settings of a benchmark, and obtaining consistent,
informative quotes for many years into the future seems unlikely as well as
276. Anu Bradford provides a compelling explication of what she terms the “Brussels Effect,”
where because the EU tends to promulgate the strictest standards, its regulations and standards tend
to become entrenched or powerfully influence legal frameworks of developed and developing
markets across the globe. See Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2012).
277. Reforming Major Interest Rate Benchmarks: Progress Report, supra note 250, at 31.
278. See Benchmarks, supra note 272.
279. Support through governmental regulation can thus bolster a multiple benchmark system.
To the extent the U.S. adopted regimes similar to those promulgated abroad, or explicitly
incorporated IOSCO principles for benchmarks, it could help ensure fair access to multiple
benchmarks and shore up the integrity of each benchmark. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 14, at
842 (advocating for FSA oversight to accompany Rauterberg and Verstein’s intellectual property
regime to ensure fair access to LIBOR).
280. This can be analogized to the role of underwriters—who are also powerful and
concentrated—in assisting issuers when drafting contracts: because they have great expertise and
influence over the choice of contract terms, they can advise firms that they will recommend the
same contracting terms in the future, ensuring the network utility of that term. See, e.g., Kahan &
Klausner, supra note 118, at 738–40. Kahan and Klausner also discuss the possibility of crosssubsidies from early to later adopters of a contract term. Id. at 739–40.
281. See Tabb & Grundfest, supra note 238, at 27. This is already being contemplated to some
extent. See Williams, supra note 21.
282. See Reforming Major Interest Rate Benchmarks: Progress Report, supra note 250, at 30.
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time-consuming and costly. However, one could imagine a scenario in which
such contracts provided for a new reference rate as a fallback.
Ultimately, while it is not the purpose of this Article to delineate specific
frameworks for transitioning to multiple benchmarks, it bears mentioning
that (a) a “mix-and-match” compatibility structure through which benchmark
administrators could charge fees might incentivize benchmark promulgation
and competition; (b) benchmark registration and regulation as to prices and
fees could promote adoption of additional benchmarks, with additional policy
intervention as necessary, without being too intrusive or requiring massive
regulatory overhaul; and (c) market forces could help generate a new
equilibrium, with subsequent updating and adjustments in response to
changing market conditions.
Finally, it is worth noting that these proposed reforms should not
displace those aimed at strengthening monitoring and deterrence. For
example, certain regulators are already periodically reviewing submission
and transaction data that is used to set benchmarks.283 Banks have been
required to turn over large amounts of data in enforcement actions.284 Dealers
could also provide data as to their exposure to a benchmark, which could
provide information as to potential incentives to manipulate (the more
exposure, the greater potential benefit).285 Moreover, it is possible that
simply knowing that regulators have the option of accessing data or
scheduling audits could deter wrongdoing.286 Similarly, regulators could
consider installing monitors at dealer banks, a step that has already been taken
by some regulators in some circumstances.287 With respect to cost, having
this monitor be funded by the bank, or imposing potential liability or
283. See, e.g., Press Release No. 15-499, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 18 ’’(documenting
that Deutsche Bank must retain a corporate monitor for three years); Press Release No. 6289-12,
U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, CFTC Orders Barclays to pay $200 Million Penalty for
Attempted Manipulation of and False Reporting concerning LIBOR and Euribor Benchmark
Interest Rates’ (June 27, 2012), https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/6289-12 (requiring
Barclays to, among other things, install firewalls, retain communications and documents, audit and
monitor submissions, regularly submit compliance reports to the CFTC).
284. Press Release No. 12-815, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Barclays Bank PLC Admits Misconduct
Related to Submissions for the London Interbank Offered Rate and the Euro Interbank Offered Rate
and Agrees to Pay $160 Million Penalty’ (June 27, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/barclaysbank-plc-admits-misconduct-related-submissions-london-interbank-offered-rate-and.
285. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 14, at 821 (arguing that banks should disclose their
exposure to benchmark administrators).
286. See, e.g., Rory Van Loo, Regulatory Monitors: Policing Firms in the Compliance Era, 119
COLUM. L. REV. 369, 414–19 (2019).
287. See, e.g., Consent Order Under New York Banking Law Sections 39 and 44, In re Barclays
Bank
PLC,
(NY
State
Dep’t
of
Fin.
Servs.
May
20,
2015),
https://www.dfs.ny.gov/system/files/documents/2019/01/ea181218_barclays.pdf
(noting the independent monitor installed at Barclays that will report to the DFS); Press Release No.
15-499, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 18 (documenting that Deutsche Bank must retain a
corporate monitor for three years).
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sanctions if a monitor fails to report wrongdoing could be extremely
effective.288
Ultimately, the focus of any reforms should be on bolstering efficiencies
already achieved in OTC markets and better aligning incentives. An
important means for doing this lies in encouraging multiple benchmarks in
conjunction with any reform targeting the robustness of benchmarks.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has advocated for a bottom-up approach to conceptualizing
OTC market structures and their attendant efficiencies and inefficiencies. By
resisting the assumption that observed equilibria are the most optimal ones,
this Article shows that the persistence of certain benchmarks should not be
taken to necessarily indicate their desirability. In markets that are otherwise
opaque, decentralized, and dominated by a few powerful players,
overreliance on default structures can lead to inefficient lock-in, facilitate
wrongdoing, and reduce the effectiveness of discipline around benchmarks.
In such markets, the network effects of benchmarks can be revolutionary, but
can also entrench a single “default” benchmark across vast market segments.
Thus, careful consideration should be given to alternative competitive
equilibria containing multiple benchmarks. The ambition of this Article is
not to prescribe a number of benchmarks or detail a new competitive
equilibrium—rather, it is to urge skepticism of current structures and
demonstrate the benefits of additional benchmarks and different competitive
equilibria.

288. See, e.g., Stavros Gadinis & Colby Mangels, Collaborative Gatekeepers, 73 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 797, 840–41 (2016).

